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FOREWORD
Insurgents making use of terrorist techniques are
fighting to shape the attitudes and perceptions of
the public to undermine the public will to fight. In a
modern age, this is done by shaping media coverage.
It is not going too far to say that terrorist attacks are, in
fact, media events, designed to draw the attention of
the press since, without a larger audience, a terrorist
attack will have accomplished very little.
This monograph, by Dr. Cori E. Dauber, argues that
terrorist attacks today are often media events in a second sense: information and communication technologies have developed to such a point that these groups
can film, edit, and upload their own attacks within
minutes of staging them, whether the Western media
are present or not. In this radically new information
environment, the enemy is no longer dependent upon
the traditional media. This is, she argues, the “YouTube
War.”
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph, which methodically lays out the
nature of this new environment in terms of its
implications for a war against media-savvy insurgents,
and then considers possible courses of action for the
Army and the U.S. military as they seek to respond
to an enemy that has proven enormously adaptive to
this new environment and the new type of warfare it
enables.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
There is a vast literature on the potential for new
technologies to create a Revolution in Military Affairs
or “networked warfare,” but that is a discussion of the
impact of military technology on the way the force
itself can be used. Today there is a question regarding
the impact of new communication and information
technologies in the hands of civilians—some of whom
are combatants—on the environment in which the force
will be used. This monograph argues that the impact of
these technologies has been, and will be, great enough
that the way they are shaping the battlefield needs to
be understood.
Waging war against terrorists (or insurgents using a
terrorist playbook) is a qualitatively different enterprise
from earlier wars. By definition, terrorists are too weak
to fight successful conventional battles. They fight to
shape the perceptions and attitudes of the public—a
battle over the public's will to continue fighting,
whether that is the indigenous public insurgents seek
to intimidate or the domestic American public they
seek to influence so as to force counterinsurgents to
withdraw from the battlefield prematurely. And in
the modern world, this will be a battle to shape media
coverage.
Terrorist attacks ought to be understood as
consciously crafted media events, and while that has
always been the case, today it is more true than ever
before in two ways. First, the terrorist attack is itself
often designed and intended for the cameras. Terrorist
attacks are designed for an audience. Their true target
is not that which is blown up—that item, or those
people—for that is merely a stage prop. What is really
being targeted are those watching at home. The goal,
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after all, is to have a psychological effect (to terrorize),
and it isn’t possible to have such an effect on the
dead.
This means that the terrorist attack is a media event
in the sense that it is designed to attract the attention
of the media, the same way that a political campaign
event is a media event designed to attract the media’s
attention and thus garner coverage. When we discuss
media attention, we are really first and foremost talking
about television, and we are really then talking about
gaining the attention of the cameras—and the way to
do that is to provide good visuals, however those are
defined in a particular context.
Understanding the interaction between media
needs and the way terrorist attacks satisfy those
needs is essential. This is the case because developing
strategies to fight an insurgent enemy has become
more challenging as today’s wars are taking place in
a radically new information and media environment,
and today’s terrorists and insurgents have been brilliant at capitalizing on this environment in their
operational art.
For today, terrorism is a media event in a
second sense. Terrorists and insurgents are now no
longer dependent upon the professional media to
communicate. In fact, to an unprecedented degree,
the professional media have become dependent upon
them. This is due to technological developments which
permit any terrorist to film, edit, and upload their
actions virtually in real time whether Western media
are there to serve witness or not.
Several new technologies, all of which have become
relatively mature at relatively the same time, together
have made this new information environment, and it
is this environment on which terrorists and insurgents
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are capitalizing. An information or communication
technology becomes mature when it meets several
criteria. First, it must be available off-the-shelf. Second, it must be affordable, something within financial
reach of a decent percentage of the population. Third,
critically, it must be small enough to be easily portable.
Fourth, it must be available in most of the world, and
not just in the developed countries.
In the last few years, several technologies have
met these criteria. Cameras of increasing quality (even
high-definition) have become progressively cheaper
and smaller even in countries without dependable
electricity. Laptop computers are similarly available
worldwide and at progressively lower prices and
higher quality. The software that permits images to
be edited and manipulated is available worldwide,
requiring no training beyond the instructions that
come with the software. The Internet alone is a powerful, even revolutionary, tool; the Internet in combination with these other technologies has the potential to
be used as a weapon.
Technology, however, and the rapidly improving
ways to distribute and disseminate content that
technology makes possible, is nothing without the
content itself. Consider that, “. . . al-Qaeda [in Iraq]
(AQI) and other terrorist organizations used to
articulate their battle plan with rocks, and stones,
and sticks, now we see them using power points with
laptops and projectors on a wall.”1 The content is
sophisticated and improved steadily (although there is
evidence that, at least in some areas, coalition efforts
did manage to ultimately degrade their sophistication
substantially.2)Media labs are decentralized, (even as
media strategies seem to be centralized) and the labs
themselves are never connected to the Internet. Rather,
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any editing, production, and video compression is done
in the labs. Once complete, videos are downloaded to
thumb drives or (more likely, given the size of video
files) portable hard drives and then taken elsewhere to
be uploaded to the web.3
How important was this effort to the insurgency in
Iraq—and how important was the effort against their
use of media technology to the ultimate success of the
coalition effort? Between June and roughly November
2007 (roughly the period corresponding to the “surge”),
American forces captured eight media labs belonging
to AQI. In these labs they found a total of 23 terabytes
of material that had not yet been uploaded to the web.
Coalition forces made the labs a priority target under
General David Petraeus because of their importance
to AQI operations, recruitment, and funding. The loss
of those labs, according to the Multi-National ForceIraq (MNF-I), resulted in more than an 80 percent
degradation of AQI’s capacity to get new material on
the web as of September 2007, critical because it was the
videos that played a large role in bringing in recruits
from the larger Arab world.
Recommendations.
All of this is made more urgent by the fact that
the American television networks, unable for a
variety of reasons to obtain usable combat footage on
a regular basis, all depend on insurgents for visual
product. That is, they download footage of attacks
insurgents have staged, filmed, and posted, then
use that as news footage as if it had been filmed by
Western photojournalists. The audience is almost
never provided adequate warning as to the source of
the footage. A number of ways audiences could be
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properly “cued” to the source of footage is offered. The
government has no way to compel the press to comply
with these recommendations. Therefore, we must be
aware of ways technology works for the insurgent—
and look for ways to make technology work for us.
The Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS,
has taken the lead here, for example, by embracing
the potential inherent in blogging, but these kinds
of initiatives will require Army-wide support, both
in terms of resources (bandwidth) and education
(ensuring users are sensitive to security concerns, for
example.) But the primary issue will continue to be
responding to insurgent uses of technology in a more
nimble and powerful way.
If the truth about an event that has made the news
is not known, then by all means an investigation is
in order, because nothing will erode credibility more
rapidly than to reverse positions already taken. But it
is critical that investigations be completed as quickly
as possible while issues remain in the public eye, and
that they not be used as a rhetorical crutch if there is
no real need for them.
If the truth is known, military spokespeople need
to be proactive, to engage in rapid response or, if at all
possible, to get out ahead of stories that are predictable. When investigations are necessary, the military
must understand that bringing them to closure as
rapidly as possible—meaning before the story has
fallen off the media’s radar—is absolutely essential.
It is not about satisfying the press, an annoyance that
interferes with the mission. If the story has the potential to
erode public support, either domestically or internationally,
then it is, in fact, mission critical. Because once the story
leaves the natural ebb and flow of the news cycle,
announcing the results of an investigation will mean
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very little. The resolution of a story never gets the
same attention as the original story, and the original
impression is the one that most people will be left
with. Over and over, accusations that the American
military killed civilians are page 1 news. Reports of the
investigation proving those accusations false, if they
come after the story has played out, are page 32 news.
Trying to change that approach to reporting the news
is wasted effort—understanding the way the news is
reported and adapting to it is critical.
Whenever possible the military must be proactive.
Opportunities come along to get ahead of a particular
story or, on occasion, make news, and the military has
too often been too hesitant. For example, when enemy
media labs were captured, some of the material found
was what might be referred to as Islamist blooper reels,
several of which are described in the monograph, and
would have been quite powerful if released.
Having footage of that nature presents an
opportunity. Circulated, it would have made that
group look ridiculous, puncturing their carefully
crafted image of competence, toughness, and
manliness. Why the hesitance? There was, of course, a
famous video released of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one
which made him look very foolish. Apparently, there
were negative reactions to that video that led to the
decision to hold off on further releases. These polling
data were unavailable, so it is impossible to comment
on it, but when a communications strategy does not
work as hoped, it is often better to look for ways to
improve upon the execution of the strategy than to toss
it out entirely. Was the response to the Zarqawi video
so negative that there is absolutely no point revisiting
the use of such material, in any configuration, with
any framing or presentation, at any point? Or were
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there nuances to those responses that could be used
in crafting such releases? I cannot say without access
to the data, but surely there is some way to make use
of material such as this when it falls into the military’s
possession. Closer study of the Zarqawi data is clearly
warranted—if this material has been found in some
labs, it will be found in others, and having a skeletal
strategy in place that takes that experience into account
would be well worthwhile. At a minimum, determining
if the negative response was to some extent contextbased is very important.
The problem is that all too often the American
military has been reactive, for example, responding by
saying that an incident is “under investigation.” That
is not a response. That answer simultaneously freezes
the potential for response—because what it says is that
no real response will be forthcoming for an indefinite
period of time—and one that opens the possibility
that the claims made by the other side might be true,
because if they were not, what would be the need for
an investigation?
ENDNOTES
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for the Combined Media Processing Center, Qatar, Interview by
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YOUTUBE WAR:
FIGHTING IN A WORLD OF CAMERAS IN
EVERY CELL PHONE
AND PHOTOSHOP ON EVERY COMPUTER
. . . modern wars are won on television screens and Internet
websites. These are the battlefields that really matter, the arenas
that frame the war and the scoreboards that determine the losers
and the winners.
				
Gabriel Weimann1

Virtually since the day the Global War on Terror
(GWOT) began, it has been widely understood to be
an information war. But there has been too little analysis
of what exactly that means, how precisely an information war (fought during an information age) might differ
from other, earlier forms of war, and in particular what
role technology might play in shaping such a war. There
is, of course, a vast literature on the potential for new
technologies to create a Revolution in Military Affairs
or networked warfare, but that discusses the impact
of military technology on the way the force can be
used in military operations. The question here is what
the impact of new communication and information
technologies in the hands of civilian forces—some of
whom are combatants—will be on the environment in
which the force will be used. This monograph argues
that the impact of these new technologies has been,
and will be, enormous; certainly great enough that
the way they are shaping the battlefield needs to be
understood.
The argument first examines the nature of this new
information environment as it pertains to fighting war,
then considers the power of the visual image generally,
and in the context of the Iraqi innovation in terms
of the way propaganda is structured and utilized.
1

Next evaluated is the role and importance of media
representations of dead bodies, the role they play in
both propaganda and news coverage, in particular
distinctions made by news outlets between bodies
shown covered and bodies shown exposed. Other
types of videos—in particular those having to do with
hostage situations—are then examined, and finally the
author draws conclusions and offers recommendations
for dealing more effectively and proactively with
enemy propaganda visuals.
Waging war against terrorists (or insurgents using a
terrorist playbook) is a qualitatively different enterprise
from earlier, or different, wars. By definition, terrorists
are too weak to fight conventional battles. The question
is what kind of battle, then, are they fighting? They
fight a battle to shape the perceptions and attitudes
of the public—a battle over the public’s very will to
continue fighting, whether that is the indigenous
public insurgents seek to intimidate or the domestic
American public they seek to influence so as to force
counterinsurgents to withdraw from the battlefield
prematurely. And in the modern world, this will, of
necessity, be a battle to shape media coverage.
Terrorist attacks today ought to be understood as
consciously crafted media events, and while that has
arguably always been the case to some degree, today
that is more true than ever before in two senses. First,
the terrorist attack is itself very often designed and
intended for the cameras. Terrorist attacks are for an
audience or else they have no meaning. Their true
target, in other words, is not actually that which is
blown up or destroyed—that item, or those people—
for that is merely a stage prop. What is really being
targeted is those who are watching at home. The goal
after all, is to have a psychological effect of some sort
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(to terrorize) and it is not possible to have such an effect
on those who are already dead.
It is for that reason that the military force fighting
today against a terrorist organization in defense of
a democratic state is really fighting a two-front war.
There is on the one hand the ground war, meaning the
war that has to actually be won on the ground, the
state of play on the ground as it exists in reality. But
there is also the air war, meaning the war as it exists on
the nation’s front pages and television screens. For a
democracy, winning one and not the other will always
mean losing, and losing in a very real sense, because
the loss of public support means that the war will come
to an end, period.
This means that the terrorist attack is a media event
in the sense that it is designed to attract the attention
of the media, to gain the media’s attention, the same
way that a political campaign event is a media event,
designed to attract the media’s attention and thus
garner coverage. As in the case of the presidential
campaign, when we discuss media attention we are
really first and foremost talking about television. When
we are talking about gaining television’s attention,
we are really talking about gaining the attention of
the cameras—and the way to do that, of course, is to
provide good visuals, however those are defined in a
particular context.2
The New Information Environment.
Unfortunately, developing strategies to fight such
an enemy is particularly challenging because today’s
wars are taking place in a radically new information
and media environment, and today’s terrorists and
insurgents have been brilliant at capitalizing on this
environment in their operational art.
3

Throughout history, terrorists (and insurgents) have
gravitated towards the newest and most sophisticated
communication technologies available. They have
often seen the potential in such technologies very
quickly, and have proven adept at developing flexible
and creative new applications almost as quickly as
these technologies have become available to them. In
particular, they have used communication technologies
to sidestep the traditional media, which has made it
possible for such groups to get their message out to
their followers in a direct, unfiltered fashion.
Thus, for example, in Iran, the Shah might have
controlled the media and the Ayatollah Khomeni might
have been exiled to Paris, but personal cassette tapes
had been developed and become widely available for
personal use by the late 1970s. They were perfect for the
Ayatollah’s supporters, at the time an anti-government
insurgency. After a sermon had been recorded by him
in Paris, copies could be made with relatively little
difficulty, for relatively little cost. And at this point each
copy was easily portable, easily hidden on the person
of an individual supporter, and easily passed from one
supporter to the next after it had been listened to. In
this fashion the exiled Ayatollah’s message was spread
throughout Iran despite his lack of access to traditional
media within the country, a smart use of technology
in those pre-Internet days.3 Today, al-Qaeda and its
affiliated groups have found ways to use online videosharing sites such as YouTube, Liveleak, and Google
Earth to provide precise targeting and mapping for
operations, continue to explore aggressively the
potential of such new applications as Twitter,4 and are
discussing the possibilities for an “invasion” of the
social networking site Facebook.5
Today terrorism is a media event in a second sense.
This is the age of the YouTube War. Terrorists (and,
4

again, insurgents using terrorist methods) no longer
depend upon the professional media to communicate
with their own constituents and no longer depend
upon the professional media to communicate with the
outside world. (In fact, to an unprecedented degree,
the professional media have become dependent upon
them.) Technological developments permit any terrorist
cell to film, edit, and upload their actions virtually in
real time whether Western media are there to serve
witness or not.
In this radically different information environment,
a situation where not one, but a confluence of new
technologies have all become available simultaneously, the possibility for synergistic effects is created,
producing an entirely new environment from that of
previous wars. Obviously the Internet is first among
equals; a revolutionary information tool in and of itself,
connecting the entire world in entirely new ways. It
has been suggested that its impact is comparable to
that of the first printing press.
The average citizen, meanwhile, has become
empowered to film what he or she sees, to edit those
images, and then to upload them for the entire world
to see. It is an entire group of new technologies, all of
which have become relatively mature at relatively the
same time, which have together made for this new
information environment, and terrorists and insurgents
are capitalizing on this environment successfully.
For our purposes, an information or communication
technology becomes mature when it meets several
criteria. First, it must be available off-the-shelf, that is
to say it must be commercially available to the general
public, not only to military and law enforcement
communities or reviewers for consumer product
columns. Second, it must be relatively affordable,
something within reach of a decent percentage of the
5

population, and not merely a toy of the super-rich.
Third, and this is critical, it must be small enough to be
easily portable. Fourth, it must be available in most of
the world, and not just in the developed countries.
In the last few years, which technologies have
met these criteria? Cameras of increasing quality
(even high-definition) have become cheaper and
cheaper (and smaller and smaller) even in countries
without dependable electricity. Laptop computers
are similarly available worldwide, at lower and lower
prices and higher and higher quality. And the software
that permits images to be edited and manipulated is
available worldwide, requiring no training beyond the
instructions that come with the software itself. In fact,
while software such as Movie Maker 3 is easily available
around the world and easily mastered without special
training, it is not really necessary to purchase even
something that unsophisticated—someone with just a
little computer savvy (and realistically these days that
is quite a number of the world’s young people) can
download free shareware at zero cost or, with a great
deal of computer savvy, hack something for free that
is not in the public domain. (Or they can acquire what
they need from the nonterrorist hacker or criminal
communities.6) The Internet alone is a powerful, even
revolutionary, tool: the Internet, in combination with
these other technologies, has the potential to be used
as a weapon.
A benign example of what is made possible when
these technologies come together was seen during (and
in the immediate aftermath of) the tsunami of December
2004. Western reporters were not in place at the time,
tsunamis not being predictable events, but there were
people there with cameras, people who were able to
capture the wave and the devastation that resulted,
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(sometimes simply by pointing their cameras over
their shoulders as they ran), and to get their footage
onto the Internet hours, if not days, before professional
reporters were even able to get to the strike zone.
Thus the first images the rest of the world saw—and
therefore, to a great extent, the first the outside world
really knew of what had happened—came from citizen
journalists whose images were appropriated by the
professional media, for the simple enough reason that
they lacked any others. This process is described most
eloquently in an essay posted—no surprise—on a web
blog, one of the constantly growing number of websites
maintained by individuals or groups where thoughts
or opinions are posted to the web, and therefore to the
entire world.
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 illustrates how
a physical event breaks into the worldwide public
information system. On December 26, 2004, after a huge
earthquake off the west coast of Sumatra was detected,
some seismologists realized it could generate a tsunami
that could ravage vast coastal areas. But this suspicion
remained in an informational limbo. The Sumatran
earthquake released more energy than hundreds of
nuclear bombs, but this physical fact would not register
on the world’s consciousness until it could be reported
as a story.

The author continues:
When the tsunami crashed ashore there were no press
photographers waiting for it. It was the ordinary tourist
with a digital cameras (sic) and an Internet connection—
the blogger—who brought the first accounts of the
monster to the world. Sheer weight of numbers ensured
that the Internet-connected citizen was in the position
to witness one of the most awesome natural events
of the early 21st century. Within hours their digital
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pictures and video, sometimes shot over the shoulder
as they were on the run, and first-person narratives had
percolated upward through the larger Internet sites to
the mainstream media.7

Indeed, mainstream media outlets are attempting
to capitalize on viewers’ desires to produce their
own content. CBS News, as part of its coverage of the
NCAA basketball tournament in 2007, encouraged
fans to create short clips cheering their teams on—or
taunting rivals—to be posted on a dedicated website
linked to the one set up by the network for their own
coverage of the tournament.8 And CNN co-sponsored
two presidential debates during the 2008 cycle with
YouTube, allowing viewers to submit questions to
candidates in the form of video clips.9
A less benign example occurred within hours of the
hanging of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi government
released the official video, but it was less than a day later
before the bootleg appeared—a video that had been
made with a cell phone camera and was then widely
distributed internationally via the Internet and inside
Iraq from cell phone to cell phone. While the traditional networks were still considering which images from
the official video were appropriate to show on the air,10
any viewer with an Internet connection could easily
view the entire hanging for themselves, by watching
the bootleg.11
Terrorist Home Videos: The Power of the Image.
Technology, however, and the rapidly improving
ways making it possible to distribute and disseminate
content, are nothing without the content itself. Today’s
terrorist groups were ready to take advantage of the
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opportunities afforded by these new technologies
when they came along because they had realized the
power of imagery in propaganda (and the capacity of
new media technologies to put imagery within their
reach for propaganda purposes) some time ago.
Beginning with the Chechens fighting against the
Russians in the early 1990s, one innovation in terrorist
propaganda made possible by innovations in media
technology was the filming of terrorist attacks by the
terrorists themselves. The Chechens took the footage
they accumulated and produced full length videos,
a development that quickly spread throughout the
jihadist movement.12 The logic that led the Chechens to
this innovation is on a direct trajectory from the logic
that first brought terrorism up-to-date for a world that
included modern mass media (meaning, of course,
television.) The Chechen leader, a Jordanian-born
terrorist named Ibn al-Khattab, justified the filming
of attacks in a way that paralleled—and extended—
the thinking of the Algerians back in the 1950s. The
Algerians’ “Directive Number Nine” argued that it
was better to kill one man where the American press
would hear of it than nine where no one would find
out. What Khattab realized was that technology had
finally put into the terrorists’ reach the ability to cut
out the middleman—the Western reporter.
He felt that if they killed a few Russian soldiers in
an ambush along a road, the impact of the strike was
limited. However, if the operation was filmed and then
shown to the Russian people, that impact was multiplied
manifold. Following through on this logic, Khattab’s men
regularly began filming roadside bombings, hostage
takings, ambushes, rocket attacks, and other activities.13
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Hezbollah, fighting to force Israel out of southern
Lebanon, was in a somewhat different situation since,
while their use of technology to film insurgent attacks
for propaganda purposes was new and innovative,
they had access to traditional broadcast venues for their
footage—television networks, in other words, which
were willing and eager to use their material. Thus they
were able to combine the new with the old, as their
use of television was anything but traditional, since
their material was being shown by networks under the
control of those sympathetic to the cause and looking
for ways to maximize the footage’s impact, not seeking
to use it in the service of objective journalism.
Nonetheless, the precedent they set is still important
to mention:
The visual media proved one of Hezbullah’s most
effective weapons. Stills, videos, and films became so
central to the organization’s military activities that it
might reasonably be claimed that they dictated both
the overall strategy and daily operations. Indeed, the
organization’s motto could be summed up in the words: “If
you haven’t captured it on film, you haven’t fought.” In this
context, the home video camera was king. A Hezbollah
guerrilla unit was accompanied by a cameraman who
would videotape their operations from the front line.14
[My emphasis]

Today even the smallest terrorist or insurgent group
active in the Islamist movement, certainly those in the
combat theaters of Afghanistan and Iraq, will have a
specific position within the organization for the person
whose responsibility is “media affairs”—in this they
mirror al-Qaeda itself15—but this is invariably one of
the highest ranking posts, obviously seen as a job of
great importance and authority.16 Indeed,
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Hamid Mir, the Pakistani journalist and bin Laden
biographer, described how he watched al-Qaeda men
fleeing U.S. bombardments of their training camps in
November 2001: “Every second al-Qaeda member [was]
carrying a laptop computer along with his Kalashnikov,”
he reported.17

According to Lara Logan, CBS News’ Senior Foreign
Correspondent and one of the very few reporters to
have continued reporting regularly from Afghanistan
during the time she was stationed in Baghdad, the
Taliban always give the person with responsibility
for media and information in an operational cell the
number two position in the cell overall.18
As that suggests, part of the reason terrorists
can take advantage of this technology as easily as
American “citizen journalists” can is that this is hardly
a phenomenon restricted to the developed world or to
citizens of the developed world. Laptops, the Internet,
cameras, cell phones equipped with cameras, and
the software that allows the user to tie it all together,
have penetrated all but the most remote corners of
the globe.19 This is “the era not only of the citizenjournalist, but also the terrorist-journalist.”20 For this
to be useful to the terrorist or insurgent, of course,
some of these technologies need to have penetrated the
larger societies they are hoping to influence. Obviously
Westerners were able to see it as soon as the video was
uploaded to their own computers, but average Iraqis,
without computers and often without electricity, were
watching the Saddam hanging on their cell phones;
often those who do not have computers at home or
do not have regular electricity do have easy access
to Internet cafes, and this is the case throughout the
Islamic world.
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The latest estimates suggest that Internet use in the
Middle East and North Africa is growing at a rate higher
than any other place in the world. Between the years
2000-05, Internet access rates grew at a measure of around
411.5% (compounded growth.) Connectivity may be
even higher than is estimated by conventional measures
because of the large number of people in the region who
use Internet cafes or community access points. . . . Jordan
even made the Guinness Book of Records for the highest
concentration of Internet cafes anywhere in the world.
There are more than 200 Internet cafes on a single street
in Irbid, Jordan.21

Connectivity has grown at a rate of 100 percent in
Iraq—but 900 percent in Algeria, 566 percent in Yemen,
and 900 percent in Morocco over that same 5-year
period.22
But the use of these technologies is not only a feature
of the insurgency in Iraq: if they are being used in a
country without regular electric power, then obviously,
they are being used in developed countries. In Britain,
for example, police arrested a group on charges that
they were plotting to kidnap a Muslim soldier on leave
from duty in Afghanistan. But they were not interested
in kidnapping him to bargain with authorities for the
release of compatriots being held in various prisons
as an earlier generation of terrorists might have done.
Apparently the plan—from its original inception—was
to kidnap someone so that the group would be able to
film an execution, and then upload that footage onto
the Internet.23 It is believed that it is when the group
was spotted purchasing a camera that British security
forces, after months of surveillance, finally moved
in and made their arrests.24 This makes sense: in this
context, the camera was as much a weapon as was the
knife.
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Or as one jihadi magazine found on Irhabi007’s computer
(an infamous webmaster for Zarqawi until his eventual
capture in London) explained: “Film everything; this is
good advice for all mujahideen [holy warriors]. Brothers,
don’t disdain photography. You should be aware that
every frame you take is as good as a missile fired at the
Crusader enemy and his puppets.”25

Today it is not just al-Qaeda but virtually every
terrorist group, no matter how small, that has a presence
on the web.26 Some groups have as many as 20 websites,
many of which are extremely sophisticated, in multiple
languages, even with separate pages specifically for
children.27 The use of the Internet is not only for internal
purposes, however. These groups also use the web as a
means to communicate with the public, using the press
as intermediary, posting communiqués, statements,
and various declarations from terrorist leaders.
Without a doubt, this material is important to their
ability to reach their own constituencies and for their
ability to recruit from those who have been labeled
“swing voters,” those in the Islamic world who have not
decided whether or not they are going to support the
global Islamist insurgency. But these are sophisticated
propagandists who are not only constructing sophisticated texts meant to simultaneously reach multiple
audiences, they are also constructing multiple texts
targeted to reach a variety of different categories of
audience. They understand that the trick is that, in
doing so, texts targeted to different audiences need to
be modified slightly for each different audience.
Iraqi Innovation: Individual Video Segments.
The twist added by the groups active in Iraq, evident
fairly early in that conflict (not available to Khattab
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given the limitations of technology when the Chechens
began producing their videos or required of Hezbollah,
with control over its own television network), was
to film individual attacks as short video segments,
perhaps lasting only as long as a few seconds, so that,
for example, many attacks on American convoys have
been filmed by terrorists hiding in what amount to duck
blinds. These segments are then uploaded individually
to the web, rather than the terrorists waiting until
they have assembled a large collection. This practice
likely started in Iraq as a result of a confluence of
technology—the easy availability of portable digital
cameras and laptops—with opportunity—a combat
theater where attacks on American soldiers were,
in fact, taking place with some regularity. And once
uploaded, of course, these videos become available
to anyone who cares to download them. This made
possible a radical change in the way terrorist websites
were structured: previous sites, even those of groups
which were quite violent, had avoided all references to
violence, they certainly would not have featured actual
images of brutal attacks.28
Susan B. Glaser and Steve Coll, writing in The
Washington Post, argue that one reason abu Musab alZarqawi rose above the pack of terrorists and insurgents operating in Iraq to achieve international stature
within the Islamist movement is that he and the people
around him understood the possibilities intrinsic to the
various technologies coming together at the same time,
how to harness the specific technological moment if you
will, in service to terrorism. And they further suggest
that the way his group has done so makes clear the
generational divide between Zarqawi’s group and bin
Laden’s.
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Zarqawi launched his jihad in Iraq “at the right point in
the evolution of the technology,” said Ben N. Venzke,
whose firm IntelCenter monitors jihadist sites for U.S.
Government agencies. High-speed Internet access
was increasingly prevalent. New, relatively low-cost
tools to make and distribute high-quality video were
increasingly available. “Greater bandwidth, better video
compression, better video editing tools—all hit the
maturity point when you had a vehicle as well as the
tools,” he said.
The original al-Qaeda always aspired to use technology in
its war on the West. But bin Laden’s had been the moment
of fax machines and satellite television. “Zarqawi is a
new generation,” said Evan F. Kohlmann, a consultant
who closely monitors the sites. “The people around
him are in their 20s. They view the media differently.
The original al-Qaeda are hiding in the mountains, not
a technologically very well-equipped place. Iraq is an
urban combat zone. Technology is a big part of that. I
don’t know how to distinguish the Internet now from
the military campaign in general in Iraq.”29

After all, as they point out, until very recently, when
the original al-Qaeda leadership wished to release an
audio file (much less a video file), they went to the effort
of getting a physical copy of a tape to an Arab satellite
television network, an old-school way of doing things.
Zarqawi’s group (now in its post-Zarqawi iteration),
like the rest of the groups operating in Iraq, from the
beginning would simply post the file to the Internet
themselves.
This does tell us something about the priorities of
the terrorist and insurgent groups American forces
are fighting. With the exception of the ever escalating
offense-defense arms race surrounding the improvised
explosive devices,30 there are no reports of weapons
being particularly advanced. Rather, they tend to be
whatever is at hand, whatever can be found in leftover
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weapons caches or smuggled into the country, while
the equipment used for the creation of propaganda, the
cameras, the computers, the software, has continued to
advance rapidly. On the one hand, there is clear and
notable evolution in the technology being used in the
generation of propaganda, based on what is being
captured in the Iraqi battlespace:
Over time technology has gone bigger and bigger. We
have seen more hard drives, as time goes on, hard drives
coming off the battlefield have become more advanced,
bigger hard drives, [with] more capability. Earlier in
the fight [there were] 20 gig hard drives, now 40, some
are 80, even 120. So we have seen an advancement as
technology across the world has increased.31

It remains the case, in fairness, that most of the
equipment recovered has generally been 3 to 5 years
old.32 And there could be any number of reasons for
that, starting with the fact that, given the difficulty
of gaining access to computers in the country during
Saddam’s time, the baseline was probably very far
behind the curve, even compared to the rest of the
region.
Where the technology itself is not the most
advanced but is several generations behind, they use
it to access cutting edge techniques, and constantly
push the envelope in terms of creative applications of
what technology allows. For example, the British have
complained that insurgents have been using Google
Earth to plan their attacks on British compounds in
Iraq more precisely.
Documents seized during raids on the homes of insurgents
last week uncovered print-outs from photographs taken
from Google. The satellite photographs show in detail
the buildings inside the bases and vulnerable areas
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such as tented accommodation, lavatory blocks, and
where lightly armored land rovers are parked. Written
on the back of one set of photographs taken of the
Shatt al Arab Hotel, headquarters for the 1,000 men of
the Staffordshire Regiment battle group, officers found
the camp’s precise longitude and latitude: . . . [a British
intelligence officer said] “We are concerned that they use
them to plan attacks. We have never had proof that they
have deliberately targeted any area of the camp using
these images but presumably they are of great use to
them.”
. . . Anyone with the internet can sign up to Google Earth
and by simply typing in the name of a location they can
receive very detailed imagery down to identifying types
of vehicles.
. . . A Google spokesman said the information could be
used for “good and bad” and was available to the public
in many forms. “Of course we are always ready to listen
to governments’ requests,” he said.33

The terrorists attacking Mumbai, of course,
famously used Google Earth in a similar way. The
difference is that they had access to blackberries, a far
more advanced platform, and one that permitted them
to follow the press coverage as the attack unfolded.
This was a return, in a sense, to the capabilities of the
Munich Olympic terrorists, using the televisions in
the athletes’ rooms to follow the press coverage and
therefore keep track of the police. The advance in
technology meant that the Mumbai terrorists could
carry their “televisions” in their hands as they moved
through the hotels, and simultaneously use them to
keep geographically dispersed teams connected.34 Still,
this is an advanced, creative application that requires
Internet access, but not necessarily the most advanced
platform on the market. By the same token, “. . . alQaeda [in Iraq] and other terrorist organizations used
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to articulate their battle plan with rocks and stones
and sticks, now we see them using power points
with laptops and projectors on a wall. So overall their
[use of] technology has improved.”35 (It should be
noted that there are clearly areas where, as a result
of Coalition efforts, the ability of insurgent groups
to produce propaganda had become so degraded
by 2008, however, that they were reduced to spray
painting graffiti on walls and underpasses, a technique
that had not been seen for several years.)36 Labs are
decentralized, apparently intentionally (even as
media strategies seem to be centralized), and the labs
themselves are never connected to the Internet. Rather,
any editing, production, and video compression is done
in the labs. Once complete, videos are downloaded to
thumb drives or (more likely, given the size of video
files) portable hard drives and then taken elsewhere
to be uploaded to the web.37 (This is known in the
vernacular as “sneaker net.”)
So many attacks, whether improvised explosive
device (IED) attacks on convoys, the detonation of
suicide bombers, the execution of hostages, or sniper
attacks on soldiers, have been filmed that it has been
suggested that attacks are staged to provide material
that can be filmed, rather than the filming being an
afterthought incidental to the point of the attack and
added after the planning is complete. As Glaser and
Coll wrote of Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq:
Never before has a guerrilla organization so successfully
intertwined its real-time war on the ground with its
electronic jihad, making Zarqawi’s group practitioners of
what experts say will be the future of insurgent warfare,
where no act goes unrecorded and atrocities seem to be
committed in order to be filmed and distributed nearly
instantaneously online.38
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They continue, “Filming an attack has become an
integral part of the attack itself.” As Army Lieutenant
Colonel Terry Guild (at the time focusing on Information Operations) explained:
They use a video camera as a mechanism to upload data
on to a website, to al Jazeera, the way we use conventional
weapons. It is part of their Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures. A U.S. soldier does a pre-combat inspection,
he checks and makes sure he’s got his bullets, his water,
all that stuff. Well, our enemy is doing that, those precombat checks [but they] include making sure that the
video guy is there with the camera, with batteries, to
either courier that video to some safe house or to get it
uploaded to some website, make sure that what they’re
doing, that message gets out. And it’s engrained . . . [it]
would be unusual if they did not do it. A lot of it has to
do with status. The bigger the attack the more video and
the more media exposure, it seems [as if the more] these
guys gain notoriety, [the more they] gain rank within the
network.39

How important has this been to the efforts of
the insurgency in Iraq? Between June and roughly
November 2007 (in other words, roughly the period
corresponding to the surge of additional forces to
Baghdad), American forces captured and destroyed
eight media labs belonging to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Two
were in Baghdad, two were in Mosul, one in Diyala
near Baquba, one in Samarra, and one in Garma. In the
eight labs, they found a total of 23 terabytes of material
that had not yet been uploaded to the web. Although
in some cases the labs were discovered in the course of
other operations, coalition forces:
have made going after these media labs or propaganda
labs a priority because we know how important these
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things are to al-Qaeda operations, we know that they use
these videos and put them on the web to recruit and to
get funding, so to attack its livelihood we have to go after
these things, so we have targeted them [specifically.]40

The loss of these eight labs, according to MNF-I,
resulted in more than an 80 percent degradation of alQaeda in Iraq’s capacity to get new material on the web
as of September 2007. Colonel Donald Bacon, Chief of
Plans for Special Operations and Intelligence, working
public affairs matters in the Strategic Communication
Department of MNF-I at the time, continued, saying:
the Internet is how they recruit and get the money, so
I think that we caught on, surely General Petraeus did,
[that]this is a huge target set we have to go after, this
is what brings in the guys from the pan-Arab world to
become terrorists, these videos. Part of it is . . . the radical
sermons and whatnot, but the Internet is a big part of
that as well.41

That said, while visual material (and specific claims
that accompany it) provide these groups a new and
powerful means of attacking their target population’s
will to continue fighting, they still need to find some
way for that material to reach the traditional media
for the visual product to be fully effective—it is highly
unlikely that sufficient numbers of people will find
this material simply by surfing the web for it to have
enough of an impact to meet a terrorist’s groups needs
or for the material’s full potential to be unleashed. For
while some of their material does indeed find its way
to the increasingly popular YouTube and similar sites,
even YouTube has only so much potential unless clips
from that site “go viral,” finding their way to multiple
other sites, personal email accounts, and ultimately the
traditional media.
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To be clear, these groups are seeking to reach multiple audiences simultaneously. The video sharing sites
may be inadequate for reaching non-Islamic audiences,
but that doesn’t mean they aren’t perfectly suited for
an Islamic one. Analysts are finding more and more
of these clips posted to sites such as YouTube, Google
Video, or Liveleak, where they have been seen by tens
or hundreds of thousands of viewers. It is a significant
concern that sympathizers of the cause outside of the
Arab world who may not speak Arabic (and therefore
lack easy access to the group’s own websites) can
easily obtain this material—or for the merely curious
to find it and thus become sympathizers.42 As-Sahab,
al-Qaeda’s media distribution organization, as well
as the Taliban, is now a regular presence on some of
these sites. (Simply type as Sahab into the search engine
of any of the sites to see how much of their material
has been posted there.43) Michael Scheuer, former CIA
analyst, offers another reason for the regular postings:
Most recently, al-Qaeda’s al-Sahab media organization
has demonstrated an ability to present, and help others
to present, a reliable source of near real-time news
coverage from the jihad fronts for Muslims. From both
Iraq and Afghanistan—where heretofore the Taliban took
almost no interest in media operations—there now flow
almost daily, high-quality videos of mujahideen military
activity against the forces of the U.S.-led coalitions,
interviews with important insurgent commanders and
tapes of the retribution exacted from those Muslims
who cooperate with the “occupiers.” These tapes are a
solid contribution to al-Qaeda’s goal of reducing Arab
and Muslim defeatism, and offer Muslims around the
world a third news source option. In addition to Western
outlets like CNN, VOA, and BBC, and the Arab satellite
channels like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyah, al-Qaeda, and
its allies have, via the internet, given Muslims another
option for viewing the news from the war zones, and
one with a blatant but well-informed Islamist slant.
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Beyond its battlefield successes, therefore, al-Qaeda and
its allies have scored an impressive media achievement,
moving from the status of jihadi cheerleaders to that of
highly modern and competent media operatives and
propagandists whose focus is on influencing the Muslim
audience. . . . a pervasive media presence via the internet.
This . . . denies the militaries of the United States and
its Western allies one pillar of their military doctrine—
information dominance. The success of al-Qaeda and
the Islamists in the media arena has denied Western
military planners much of their previous ability to shape
the battlefield environment by controlling information
flows. Indeed, it may be that the U.S. military and its
allies are now in the position of having to look for
means with which to break the Islamists’ information
domination on battlefields and contested regions across
the Muslim world.44

But the irony here is that traditional (legacy)
American media outlets now depend on the terrorists
and insurgents for content, so that by uploading this
material to the Internet and making it available to
anyone who finds it, these groups ensure that it will
find its way onto American television network news
shows as well. Because it has been impossible for the
networks to consistently acquire visually compelling
combat footage of either the fighting in Iraq or
Afghanistan for any variety of reasons, all six news
networks and news divisions—ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN,
MSNBC (the cable partner of NBC), and Fox News—
have made it a regular practice to download footage
from terrorist and insurgent websites and integrate
that visual product into their broadcasts, almost never
with any indication that the audience would be able to
determine the actual provenance of the footage.
Further, these groups are so sophisticated that
they are producing English language propaganda that
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is quite effective even aside from the attack videos.
ABC News reported that when one soldier lost a
video diary he had filmed for personal use in Iraq, the
images popped up months later on the Internet and on
al Jazeera—but with the original audio track stripped
out. It had been replaced with the voice of another
English speaker, one who purported to be the voice
of the soldier, explaining to his mother in a Christmas
message, among other things:
The crimes by our soldiers during break-ins started
to merge, such as burglary, harassment, raping, and
random manslaughter,” says the voice. “Why are we
even here? The people hate us.”45

The propagandists overstepped when they ended
their piece by pointing out that it was a tragedy that
this poor soldier had been killed in Iraq before he ever
made it home for Christmas. Unfortunately for them,
ABC was able to verify that multiple claims made
by the speaker were false, starting with the fact that
it was unlikely the soldier would have been making
a “Christmas message” for his family when he had
actually left Iraq 6 months before Christmas and ending
with the fact that the soldier was alive and well.46
ABC therefore posted it as a story about an audacious
(but ineffective) attempt at propaganda. Thus while
this may have worked as propaganda with the Arab
audience, it didn’t successfully make the jump to the
American audience.
In truth, in an interview with the author, Lieutenant
Colonel Ed Loomis, the Public Affairs Officer for the
101st Airborne Division, the soldier’s home unit, made
clear that in fact the propaganda was in this case quite
effective: ABC was preparing to do a story about the tragedy
of an anti-war soldier killed in Iraq, essentially picking
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up the story precisely as it was reported on al Jazeera.
Despite the large number of inaccuracies in that story,
(and what would seem to be the obviously over-thetop nature of the claims in the script) it was only by
finally producing the living soldier that the Public
Affairs Officer (PAO) was able to head off al Jazeera’s
story from appearing on ABC News—a story that was
created when a script written by the insurgent group the
Islamic Army of Iraq provided the basis for an audio
track subsequently added by al Jazeera. Loomis said:
. . . the only thing that they [ABC News] said was going
to pull the plug on it was, I had to put Tucker [the soldier
in question] in front of the camera. The fact that Tucker
was alive, and the fact that they got the rank wrong, and
the fact that there was no way that this was a Christmas
letter by Tucker to his family in that he had left Iraq 6
months before Christmas . . . —lie, after lie, after lie [was
not enough].47

Loomis points out that while the script was
written by the Islamic Army of Iraq, “al Jazeera did
the soundtrack, reading the letter was al Jazeera’s
construct, something for which they have apologized
to me over the phone,” although he does not know
whether they ever issued any retraction on the air.48
Why was ABC almost fooled and why did Loomis
have to work so hard to talk them out of running the
piece as it was, despite the apparent falsehoods in the
claims made by the speaker claiming to be the voice
of Specialist Tucker and what would seem on face to
be some fairly outrageous claims? Because that is the
degree of sophistication reflected in terms of the ability
to take a set of images, edit them in a way that seems to
match a new script, and have the combination appear
plausible (certainly not hurt in this case by having

24

a network’s professional sound people adding the
finishing touches). The implications are staggering: in
a combat theater awash with soldiers’ personal digital
media, commanders now must carefully instruct their
people to secure not only weapons, ammunition, and
other combat gear, but also their personal media,
because any personal images lost in a combat zone
can easily be used by the enemy in the creation of
propaganda that has the potential to be quite effective
and do serious damage.
The amount of personal digital equipment carried
by the troops has continued to skyrocket because
the technology available to average citizens in terms
of their own capacity to produce information and
communicate with others has changed in ways that
are nothing short of revolutionary. Digital cameras,
both still and moving, of increasingly high quality,
are now available in sizes that are not just portable
but small enough to be embedded in a cell phone,
and this technology is more and more affordable to
the average person. Also available is the software that
permits images to be edited (and manipulated) right
on a laptop computer, before being uploaded onto the
Internet.49
The modern battlefield is awash in digital cameras,
video cameras, and MP3 players that store images as
well as music, personal computers, and cell phone
cameras. And all of this technology—and the way it
permits troops to stay connected to the home front—
is so essential to the morale of the force (and, just as
important to retention, to the morale of the families),
there is simply no putting the toothpaste back in the
tube. Beyond mere email, we now have a force grown
accustomed to using webcams to read bedtime stories
to their children.50
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These technologies all work together, and they
work as well for the average citizen as they do for the
professional journalist. (And, of course, therefore work
as well for the terrorist as for either of them.) For the
journalist, although only 18 months elapsed between
the fighting in Afghanistan that initially overthrew the
Taliban and the conventional combat phase of the war
in Iraq, there was no comparison in terms of what was
possible technologically. Camera crews in Afghanistan
needed 75 to 100 cases for their equipment, and even
then were still not able to transmit the fighting in
real time, something that was possible in Iraq with
equipment carried in only five or six cases.51
With the help of these technologies, the modern-day
terrorist produces several categories of videos, which
are then made available on the web: heavily produced
videos that are several minutes long and with fairly
high production values, sophisticated editing, and
graphics, some of which may actually run as long
as an hour; hostage videos, which run the spectrum
from videos used to prove that a particular victim is
in a group’s possession to the final video in which a
victim is executed on film; statement videos, which are
declarations coming from a group’s senior leadership
for any one of a number of reasons; tribute videos, used
to eulogize those lost to the cause (most especially, of
course, martyrs); internal training and instructional
videos, which are never meant to be distributed to the
public and are often behind password-protected sites;
the last will and testament of the suicide bombers;
and then the operational videos, the new category
developed out of the Iraq conflict.52
The majority of the operational clips come from
Iraq, simply because this is where the bulk of such
attacks have taken place since the strategy of filming
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and posting individual attacks originated (and given
that the Taliban came to the game late, for a variety
of reasons), and they grew increasingly sophisticated
in terms of the graphics and audio used (a reflection
of the increasing sophistication of the software
available on the open market, software that generally
requires no more training than reading the instruction
manuals that come with the software itself.53) What is
particularly striking is that many now come complete
with English subtitles, even if the English is often quite
bad (sometimes, were the context different, hilariously
so.)54
In fact, as far as production values go, the software
available on the open market may not be the limiting
factor for these groups. An enormous amount of opensource software is available. (open-source software is
that which is intentionally made available for free by
the original programmer in the hopes that a community
of users will develop, in the process assisting the
programmer in improving the original program.) And
that presumes the user is particular about sticking
to the legal niceties—if the person producing the
ultimate video is casual about such things, a great deal
more software can become available through various
mechanisms.55 Based on the materials captured on the
battlefield, no Iraqi groups appear to be using Linuxbased computer software—in other words, they are not
using open-source software, but instead appear to be
limited to PC-based systems.56 This does not mean that
open-source is not being used internationally; it means
that those producing material inside Iraq are working
within self-limiting parameters, either due to resource
or, more likely, training constraints.
The gap between the degree of sophistication in
videos produced in the battlespace, by “a guy and
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a laptop”; videos produced in more elaborate (and
stationary) media labs, along the lines of those coalition
forces were able to capture in late 2007; and those
produced outside the theater entirely, is only going
to shrink as time goes by. One company is marketing
today a piece of equipment that they are calling
“basically a live TV truck in a backpack.”57 Now,
with “minimal training, anyone who can operate a
computer can use it to broadcast professional-quality
live video over the internet or on television.”58 It is
clear that neither the manufacturers nor the technology
reviewers are considering possible downsides to the
way technology opens up broadcast-quality access to
almost anyone with any kind of agenda. Yet if it were
up to me, the same kind of export controls would be
slapped on this that we put on fighter-bomber parts or
Cray super-computers.
This disruption of the normal live video production
process means content attractive to niche audiences is
now worth televising to local communities or streaming
worldwide. “You don’t have to have a million people
watching,” said Nelson [Senior Vice President, NewTek],
“because the budget of making the show is almost
nothing.”
The TriCaster is essentially a high-powered computer
with special ports. Like other computers, it plugs into a
display and it is operated using a mouse and keyboard.
The onscreen interface resembles a traditional TV-studio
switching console, but after a short tutorial, just about
anyone can figure out how to switch between cameras,
add graphics, and so on. I saw how easy this was, and
heard countless testimonials about high schoolers and
church volunteers learning how to use it in a half hour.
“We had to take a process that normally has 5 to 30
people creating a show and make it easy enough for one
person to run, [someone] who has never run a TV show
before,” explained Nelson. Indeed, the TriCaster allows
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a single operator to mix multiple cameras (higherend models support more cameras) interspersed with
graphics, pre-recorded clips, real-time effects, and more
than 300 three-dimensional transitions. The box outputs
to the web, television stations, or big screens in churches
and sporting arenas.
NewTek’s entry-level TriCaster, with support for three
cameras, costs $4,000. That may seem like a lot, but
considering that it can be used in place of a mobile
production vehicle, four grand is small potatoes,
relatively speaking.
The benefit to niche video broadcasters has been
significant. Many high schools, colleges, and minorleague sports teams can now afford to broadcast and
stream most or all of their games.59

While terrorist groups have always attempted to
reach the public on their own, we are no longer in an age
of mimeographed pamphlets or magazines reaching
a few hundred true believers while staying one step
ahead of bankruptcy from one issue to the next. In
addition to the video segments, CDs and DVDs are
still widely distributed, and, most importantly, they
too have an enormous presence on the World Wide
Web. Materials from the Iraqi battle space are found
in video format, as DVDs, as 8 millimeter films, as
minicassettes, or even in DVR format.60 These materials
serve a variety of purposes simultaneously. They are
used to recruit, to communicate between the already
committed (but now geographically dispersed), and
to provide training. The Internet, in short, became the
new Afghanistan; cyberspace replacing the lost
sanctuary in real space.61 The infamous hacker
“Irhabi007” (literally “terrorist 007”) perfected the
ability to hack into various servers—most famously that
of the Arkansas State Department of Transportation—
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to host massive files on the web using cybercrime,
such as identity theft, to finance the purchase of websites to supplement what he was able to hack as he
created a global online network in support of al-Qaeda
in Iraq (although he operated out of London.) The
laptop of one of his associates contained 37,000 stolen
credit card numbers.62
For a perfect visual representation of how important
all of these various efforts are to the insurgency in Iraq,
there is the video posted in June 2007 where the central
image is that of the speaker, urging those with the
ability to do so to take up the effort, not to fight but to
persuade in any way it is possible to do so. The image
of a single speaker is flanked on one side by a weapon,
and on the other by a laptop, also a weapon, just of
another sort.63 As Lieutenant Colonel Terry Guild put
it simply, “[T]heir media infrastructure is quick, it’s
collaborative, it’s virtual, it’s global, it’s technical, and
it’s getting better all the time.”64 How seriously is this
effort taken? One of the leading authorities on terrorist
uses of the Internet, Gabriel Weimann, quotes an alQaeda-affiliated website as posting this warning:
We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to
spread and disseminate news and information about the
Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their
own Websites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes
down before you have done this, we may hold you to
account before Allah on the Day of Judgment . . .65

The Uncovered Body: What Makes Insurgent Videos
“Propaganda?”
The press coverage of the fighting in Iraq has
included periodic stories about insurgent use of webbased propaganda.66 Distinct from news stories about
terrorist use of the web as a general phenomenon in
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other words, reporters have sometimes done stories
about specific items posted to the Internet by terrorist
or insurgent groups. These have generally been stories
about what an individual video segment tells us about
the terrorists. They tend to be stories about video
segments so graphic the footage cannot be shown in
their entirety on American television networks. But
what makes these segments so graphic, what in fact
defines graphic for American television, is that a body
is shown. And almost inevitably these segments that
are not shown, but which are discussed as news, are
explicitly labeled as terrorist or insurgent propaganda.
What none of these news pieces seems to mention,
in fact what they quite coyly ignore (whether on
television or in print), is that these video segments
generally get explicitly labeled as propaganda only
when a body is visible—making the footage unusable
by television. When one of these segments was released
which seemed to show the body of an American pilot,
for example, the release of the segment was treated by
NBC as in and of itself newsworthy.
BRIAN WILLIAMS, anchor:
Now to another story making news tonight, growing
outrage this evening over a blurry video that appears to
be the latest tool in the Iraq insurgents’ propaganda war
against the United States. The video purports to show
the burning body of an American pilot. More now from
NBC News Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski.
Jim, what is the thinking on this piece of videotape?
JIM MIKLASZEWSKI reporting:
Well, Brian, one military official in Iraq says he’s outraged
by this video, while Pentagon officials admit the video
does appear to be authentic.
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The video, complete with music soundtrack, is poor
quality but appears to show the burning wreckage of a
US Apache helicopter.
Unidentified Man: (From videotape) (Foreign language
spoken)
MIKLASZEWSKI: Shouting ‘Allah Akbar,’ ‘Allah is the
greatest,’ enemy fighters are also shown dragging the
body of at least one man across the ground. Military
officials tell NBC News only partial remains of the two
Apache pilots have been recovered from the crash site.
The helicopter was shot down while on combat patrol
Saturday just southwest of Baghdad. The video was
posted on the Internet today by a militant Islamic group,
the Mujahadeen Shura Council, with ties to al-Qaeda in
Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi has
often released videos of his attacks against Americans as
a propaganda tool to rally supporters and to raise money
for his terrorist operations in Iraq.67

But there is something left out of that report about the
way NBC—and, in fairness, all the other networks—
generally treats all those other videos.
There is a distinction between how segments are
treated by the networks when bodies are visible and
when they are not, which turns on the standards
American networks have in place for treating images of
the human body in extremis. This distinction was drawn
particularly clearly when a Bulgarian commercial
helicopter was shot down (with American contractors
on board) in 2005. Two videos were released to the
press by insurgents claiming responsibility. The first
was particularly brutal. The single survivor of the crash
was approached and told to run—which he is only able
to do with assistance getting up—at which point, on
film, they murder him (he’s shot). This video is treated
as in and of itself newsworthy, but although some
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networks air a few seconds of footage from the video
(while others air still images or no images at all), no
network airs the chilling ending. Some of the networks
using footage from the video were quite creative in
finding ways to avoid actually airing the graphic
murder, while still being true to their point: the horror
of the man’s death, and the perhaps greater horror
that it was treated as grist for the propaganda mill, for
example, blacking out the visuals while continuing the
audio track so the single shot is clearly heard by the
audience. For each network, the point of the news story
is the same: that the existence of this footage tells us
something about the nature of the enemy we are dealing
with.68 The footage may be newsworthy, but it is not itself news footage, and in several cases, the choice not to
air the final images is discussed explicitly. Interestingly,
in one case, the decision is explained by comparing
the networks’ standards to those of the Arab station al
Jazeera. CBS’s Lee Cowan states this “particular video
was so outrageous even the Arabic channel al Jazeera
refused to show the shooting itself.”69
The second tape released was claimed to be of the
shooting down of the helicopter. Interestingly, each
network presents this as a case of “he said, he said.”
Here we have two tapes, two claims, and no way to
adjudicate the dispute, and so we present you with
both. But in point of fact, by the time the network
stories were aired, the security company that owned
the helicopter had already identified the man killed in
the first tape as one of their personnel, which would
seem to clearly settle the matter. Thus while it is of
interest that different groups are attempting to get
credit for the same attack, each of these stories
presenting the two claims as of equal weight—and
using that as the basis justifying the decision to air the

33

second video—are simply wrong. There would seem to
be no basis for the second group’s claim, and therefore
no reason to air this second video, even if it is worth
mentioning its existence.
But what makes the second video of interest here
is the difference in the way the networks treated it,
compared to the first. Because it was visually of the
destruction only of a machine, it was not treated as
graphic at all, and was aired with little comment by
the networks,70 despite the fact that if authentic, it
would have been video of the deaths of quite a few
more men than the first tape. (The helicopter, after all,
carried 11 people total.) After the second video was
released, CBS’s reporter made the distinction explicit:
A group called Jaish al-Mujahideen says that they were
the ones that shot down a commercial chopper yesterday,
killing six Americans and five others. To prove it, their
video shows the helicopter being shot out of the sky. As
disturbing as this video is, it pales in comparison to what
a different militant group, the Islamic Army in Iraq,
claims to have done after the chopper crashed. A shaky
camera stumbles on what appears to be the Bulgarian
pilot, the lone survivor of the attack, lying in the grass.71

By the same token, when footage is used that shows
the death of American troops but the audiences’ view of
those troops is shielded by the vehicles they are riding
in, the footage is apparently uncontroversial, judging
from the lack of negative reaction to the practice; it
has become the norm, and as such it is unquestioned.
The footage is acceptable, in other words, because
although the bodies are present, they are not visible. Yet
when one network aired footage showing the death of
American troops out in the open—even though they
clearly identified the footage as enemy propaganda
and even though the penultimate scenes, just before
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the soldiers killed by enemy snipers slumped forward,
were blacked out—it was the cause of considerable
controversy.72
The first thing that made that story problematic
was that, while the footage was, to be sure, repeatedly
identified as propaganda, the story was not contextualized as a story about enemy propaganda
practices, as had been the case with prior stories
involving footage showing American deaths out in
the open. Instead, the fact that this was propaganda
material was acknowledged and then set aside and
the story was then contextualized as a substantive
story about enemy tactics: what did the footage tell us
about the enemy practice of killing American soldiers
by using sniper teams? In other words, this may have
been propaganda, but it was treated as conveying
legitimate, trustworthy information that was worth
evaluating on the merits all the same.
Certainly most news stories that label the segments
as propaganda never mention that the websites where
these segments are generally found are also a regular
source for the news networks—that would mean
admitting that material they are themselves explicitly
labeling as enemy propaganda in one context is also
being used by them in another context as a source for
material on a regular basis, and very often without any
particular identification that tells the viewer what the
original source was.73 Thus it is general practice for
footage to be identified explicitly as propaganda when
men are killed outside their vehicles, but to never be
identified that way when they are killed while inside
their vehicles, as even when footage is sourced to the
enemy, it is not explicitly labeled as propaganda. (The
CNN story is only barely an exception, since despite
the fact that the material is identified explicitly as
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propaganda, that quickly becomes relatively incidental
to the story.)
Thus when the body or bodies are shielded from
view by a vehicle and the footage is therefore not
treated by the broadcast press as propaganda, it instead becomes available to be treated as news footage.
It then can be seamlessly integrated into the regular
coverage of the war, not to illustrate a point about
the terrorists as in feature stories, but to illustrate the
attacks on convoys, to illustrate the daily round of
events, just as if it had been provided by AP or Reuters
or indeed the networks’ own cameramen. It is the
way CNN diverges from this practice that made their
piece so controversial—their footage was of soldiers
being killed out in the open, but their story was not
about the footage’s power or the fact it was being
used as propaganda but about its substantive value,
its value as information, presumably the exact opposite
of propaganda. It should be noted that CNN did not
acquire these particular images by downloading them
from the Internet, but rather the images were sent to
CNN by the group in question, which is what made
them exclusive. That only added to the controversy,
however. Clearly, in showing the material, CNN was
doing exactly what this group wanted them to do. You
do not send material to CNN as a general practice because you want them to keep it private. While material
is also posted to the Internet because a group wants to
share it with a larger audience, the circumstances of the
case seemed to highlight the choice made by all the networks on a regular basis, to give the enemy far greater
access to an American audience than they could ever
hope to acquire without the media’s assistance. Indeed,
in this case CNN was up front about that fact and
even claimed the group had larger ambitions for their
message. The show’s anchor, Anderson Cooper, said
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the “insurgents [were] delivering a deadly message,
aiming for a global audience,”74 and seconds later, apparently with no sense of irony, welcomed “our viewers
watching on CNN International.”75
Sometimes the segments are shown with visual
and aural cues that they were taken from a terrorist
or insurgent site, although rarely sufficient ones, given
that no effort has ever been taken to explicitly address
the fact that this is a normal journalistic practice. (It
is certainly true that periodic stories refer to claims
being made by these groups on their websites, so that
the audience might be casually aware that reporters
and networks regularly monitor such sites,76 but that
is a far cry from discussing the practice of using these
sites as a source of visual product.) Sometimes there
are no cues at all, but the fact is that these segments
are downloaded and used in this fashion by all six
networks on a fairly regular basis.77
CNN, CBS, and most recently NBC on rare occasions
have imposed a graphic—called a chyron—that states
INSURGENT VIDEO on at least some of the material, a
parallel to the practice all networks use when showing
material received from the Department of Defense
(DoD), when networks use a graphic saying something
along the line of DOD FILE FOOTAGE. This seems to
be not just a perfectly acceptable solution, but in fact a
quite elegant one, so long as it is applied consistently—
meaning whenever terrorist or insurgent websites are
the source of the footage—and throughout the length
of the footage, which does not so far seem to be the
case for some reason for any of the three networks.
In fact, doing this inconsistently might be worse than
never doing it at all, since viewers might believe that
any time the graphic is missing, the footage must by
definition not come from insurgent sources.78
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And although they do not do it in all cases, that
graphic is visible, clearly imposed on the sniper
videos that were so controversial when aired by CNN.
Ironically, since the whole point of the discussion was
that these videos had been received from an insurgent
group, this is the one case where such a graphic might
have been superfluous.
If this can be done with footage from DoD, it is hard
to understand why this cannot be done with footage
from enemy sources. The argument that leaving
whatever graphics the groups themselves might have
superimposed on the footage in place is sufficient
seems unpersuasive, given how few Americans read
Arabic. For many of these videos, simply leaving the
original Arabic graphics up as they were on the original
video will not be enough of a cue since—probably by
design—they may mimic the layout of those on a news
site, for example using a news “crawl” on the bottom.
With the groups’ logo either too small to see clearly or
unknown to most Americans, the graphics alone might
leave a viewer thinking the footage had been taken
from an Arabic language news network. However,
leaving the graphics up and then also leaving the audio
track in place and simply lowering the volume so that
the reporter’s voice can be heard is an alternative
networks have sometimes used to great effect since the
musical selections, often heavily based on chanting of
“Allahu Akhbar,” leaves little doubt that the footage
has been pulled from a propaganda video and not a
news site.79
Another alternative available to the networks is one
that can be drawn directly from the way they already
cover political campaigns today. Every campaign
cycle, political reporters do stories on campaign ads
that are particularly interesting either because they
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are especially negative, or because they deploy a new
technique in campaign ads, or perhaps because they
are simply proving especially effective. Such stories
always include clips from the ads for obvious reasons.
A number of election cycles ago, an elaborate study
involving hundreds of subjects demonstrated fairly
conclusively that the normal practice of all the networks
at the time, where the clip was shown taking up the full
television screen, confused viewers (perhaps because
they tended to watch the news while engaged in other
activities—getting dinner ready, putting kids to bed,
helping older kids with homework, paying bills, etc.)
As a result, almost universally when these clips aired,
the context—a news story about the process of the
campaign—was lost, and viewers simply assumed
the ad was being aired again. The networks, in effect,
were providing the campaigns with millions of dollars
worth of free advertising, and legitimizing any negative
or misleading claims they were in fact attempting to
critique.80
The scholar who conducted those studies, Kathleen
Hall Jamieson, called for the networks to adopt a “visual
grammar” where clips from campaign ads would be
shown imposed on a graphic of a television set, so that
it would be immediately obvious that viewers were not
simply viewing another run of the ad. (She suggested
a wide variety of visual cues beyond that one, but this
visual grammar was the most important suggestion
she had to offer.) In 1996 her suggestion was picked
up by a Pew Trusts panel, and soon after the networks
adopted it as standard practice.81 It has, of course,
since been updated so that some ads are shown using
a graphic of a laptop to signify a web-based ad.
The networks, in other words, already have these
graphics and the procedures for using them in place and
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use them on a regular basis (at least every 4 years) with
no apparent difficulties. If this method is considered
necessary to keep viewers from misunderstanding
and believing the networks are presenting material
actually produced by political campaigns, should it
not be considered equally appropriate and necessary
to keep viewers from believing the networks are the
source of material produced by those responsible for
the deaths of American soldiers and marines—not to
mention innocent civilians—in order to produce the
footage?
Let there be no mistake, this footage is shot by
terrorists and insurgents of attacks perhaps staged
for the explicit purpose of providing material for
filming. Imagine the outcry if it were suggested the
networks rely on footage of campaign events shot by
photographers on the staffs of the campaigns for their
coverage. Indeed, we do not need to imagine it, for the
press has never accepted the idea that even relatively
innocuous photographs of fairly formulaic events could
be provided by official White House photographers in
place of their being granted access themselves. The
President of the White House News Photographers
Association (WHNPA) had this to say about instances
where official White House photographers’ images
(called “releases,” “photo releases,” or “handout
photos”) were the only ones made available (or, indeed, were simply the shots chosen by news
agencies):
If we truly want to improve coverage at the White House
and maintain credibility as journalists, we must press
the decision makers at our news organizations not to use
handout photos and strongly encourage independent
press coverage of the daily activities of the President.”82
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In fact, she said, “I pointed out that with the significant
numbers of White House ‘photo releases,’ White House
photographers are crossing the line from documentary
photographers to White House PR photographers.”
The point is that as “long as independent photojournalists are excluded from coverage of the daily
activities of the President, coverage of the White House
is compromised.”83
The contradiction is fairly sharp. One set of
photojournalists argues that unless independent press
photographers cover every event, no matter how
mundane or banal and no matter how few choices
might seem available for representing the scene visually (the WHNPA President specifically mentions the
photographs of the President looking out the window
of Air Force One after Hurricane Katrina as a triumph
for her organization’s members), then the coverage is
completely compromised. The people staging an event
cannot be the same ones providing the images of it. That is
the clear standard articulated. Yet in the second case,
which would seem so much more charged, so much
more open to the photographer’s ability to alter what
we see, news outlets are more than happy to accept
footage provided by the very people staging the event
being filmed, when the event—and the footage—seems
likely to be far more subject to manipulation than what
results from a standardized, even ritual, public meeting of the President with some foreign official—which
is, at the end of the day, two middle-aged guys sitting
side by side in easy chairs.
It is worth noting that the kinds of photographs the
members of the WHNPA are so concerned with always
appear with captions, and those captions almost always include credits. News outlets, in other words,
provide transparency for their audiences so that when
the photographic images they use have been provided
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by the White House and not their own staff, their
readers have a way, with very little effort, of discovering that. If network news divisions feel they have no
alternative to taking visual product from insurgent
websites, just as they sometimes have no alternative to
taking visual imagery from DoD (or the White House)
because no other images are available, then they owe
their viewers transparency: the audience needs a
way to know where the images came from, and who
produced them. Why would that be necessary if the
images were produced by DoD but not necessary if
they were produced by the nation’s enemies?
Perhaps more important than the fact that the footage has been shot by these groups is that they are all
edited by terrorists and insurgents, even if they are then
edited again by network personnel. It is propaganda
material, not news footage, or else the very idea
of a difference between the two has no meaning
whatsoever. As Ben Venzke articulates it, the “videos
are a form of follow-on psychological attack on the
victims and societies the group is targeting. They are
designed to amplify the effects of attacks . . .”84 Hoffman
writes about terrorist use of the web generally, rather
than about these segments specifically, but gives an
assessment that is clearly applicable here:
It [the web] also enables terrorists to undertake what
Denning has termed “perception management”: in
other words, they can use it to portray themselves and
their actions in precisely the light and context they
wish—unencumbered by the filter, screening, and spin
of established media. The internet also facilitates their
engagement in what has been referred to as “information
laundering,” taking an interesting or provocative video
clip and/or sound bite, and featuring it and focusing on
it and creating an “internet buzz” about it in the hope
that it will move into the mainstream press.85
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They no longer have to try to create “buzz” to move a
clip into the mainstream press: they are now the press’s
primary source of news footage when it comes to the
vital issue of attacks on American military personnel
in Iraq. All they have to do is make the material
available.
Consider again the sniper tapes aired by
CNN. While they made for particularly powerful
propaganda material because of the strength of the
visceral emotional reaction they inevitably evoked,
they presented a distorted view of the threat faced
by American troops. The numbers tell the tale: as of
mid-February 2007, sniper fire had accounted for 1.3
percent of all American deaths in Iraq, the least likely
cause of hostile fire responsible for a combat death
and less likely to kill American service members
than nonhostile weapons discharge. Since the start of
the war, 41 Americans had been killed by sniper fire
compared to 1,134 killed by IEDs, the single greatest
risk to American military personnel and responsible
for 36.3 percent of all American military deaths in
Iraq.86
Lara Logan, CBS’s senior correspondent in Baghdad
at the time, argues that the practice of using terrorist
and insurgent footage is a legitimate one for several
reasons. First and foremost, she argues that since there
is no other way this footage could have been acquired,
people would simply assume the source although
she is very clear that she is always very specific with
viewers as to what the source is. She believes the
audience would make this assumption in part because
of the difference in quality—network professionals do
not produce grainy black and white footage.87 Without
empirical research, there is no way to answer the
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question, but I am highly skeptical of this position. I
suspect if nothing is said one way or the other, most
viewers would likely assume footage is provided by
news crews or simply not think about the question at
all, since I do not believe most Americans are aware
there is no other way the footage could have been
acquired: the constraints on reporting this war are
new to this war. (This is based in part on the anecdotal
experience of a number of public presentations on the
topic. In my experience, audiences, including military
audiences, are inevitably surprised to learn network
visual material is sourced in this way.) Networks now
air footage of low, amateurish quality in any number
of circumstances, most often when the footage is of
breaking news events and has been provided by socalled “citizen-journalists”—in other words, people
who just happened to be in the vicinity with a cell
phone camera and had the wits to start filming when
something newsworthy happened in front of them. If
audiences think about this footage at all, most people
probably assume it falls in that category and that it was
shot by American soldiers, in other words by those
targeted by the attack, not by those launching it.
While the constraints on professional journalists
have been discussed in detail in the various venues
where the coverage of the war is itself the topic (trade
publications focused on journalism, for example), there
has been little or no mention of those constraints built
into the actual reporting so that the mass audience may
be only vaguely aware of them, if at all. If it is simply
impossible to report without using this footage, it
would seem that given how this practice seems to clash
with journalistic norms and practices in other areas,
the very least that is required is stringent requirements
to assure transparency. Rather than making the
assumption that their audiences must know what the
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source of the footage is, the networks need to do
everything possible to assure that there can be no
question whatsoever as to the source of a particular
piece of footage.
Making it even less likely this footage will be
detected by the average viewer is that in the majority
of cases, this footage is integrated quite seamlessly into
news pieces, and the editor is often drawing as little
attention as possible to the differences between the
footage acquired by network professionals and that
acquired from terrorists or insurgents.
If one watches John Yang’s February 7, 2007, piece,
aired on NBC, on a series of American helicopters
having been shot down in Iraq, there is (with the
exception of one very brief shot lasting less than 5
seconds) absolutely no way to tell that terrorist video
is being used: the jumps between terrorist footage, that
apparently shot by network cameramen (it is possible
some of it might be DoD footage, as well), and that
shot during an earlier battle with the cell phone of
an Iraqi soldier; are all seamless.88 If a viewer did not
know what they should be looking for—or that they
should be looking for it—it is hard to imagine they
would notice it. ABC used the same terrorist-provided
footage, but because Martha Raddatz’s piece began
with that footage and used a continuous stretch of it
at the beginning, rather than integrating it throughout
the piece, it is somewhat easier to notice, particularly
in contrast to that shot by ABC personnel and used
throughout the rest of the piece.89 CBS’s Logan, on the
other hand, did clearly identify the source of the video
she acquired from the Islamic State of Iraq. She said:
CBS News has learned that their transport helicopter
was shot down during what the military called “routine
operations.” But before the US could announce the
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cause of the crash, a jihadi Website linked to al-Qaeda
was already declaring victory. It said, quote, “The
Air Defense Division of the Islamic State of Iraq has
succeeded in shooting down and completely burning a
Chinook helicopter.” There was no way to verify their
claim, but the same group posted this video on the Internet
last weekend, boasting they shot down a US attack
helicopter close to Baghdad.90 [Author’s emphasis]

That does, indeed, seem to be about as fair to the
viewer as possible. These choices, however, reflect
those made by particular reporters and producers on a
particular night. Part of the problem is that there does
not seem to be any consistent standards or policies
concerning the use of this material. And part of the
problem is that while some of these videos are poorly
made with extremely low-tech equipment (hand held
cameras, perhaps cell phone cameras), others are of
extremely high quality made with high end equipment
and are very difficult to distinguish from what
professionals would have produced. Indeed, that may
be because professional equipment was used to produce them. Some of the videos have been so
professionally done that the individual responsible
for processing all media artifacts captured on the Iraqi
battlefield as of December 2007 is convinced that some
of the insurgent videos were produced using al Jazeera
facilities and was willing to go on the record with
that claim.91 Some reporters believe there is simply
no difference; that the point of view or perspective
reflected in this footage, in other words, is no different
from what would be reflected in the footage that would
have been shot by a network cameraman had he or she
been on the scene.
The idea that footage shot by a professional
photojournalist and footage shot by a jihadist propagandist would hypothetically be interchangeable
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is a somewhat surprising one, but, even if it were
true, it ignores, of course, the fact that any footage
posted has also been edited by propagandists. We do
not know what footage the professional would have
returned with because we do not know how closely
the propagandist’s work matches what actually
happened—that is part of what makes it propaganda.
The famous film Triumph of the Will, made by
“Hitler’s film director” Leni Riefenstahl to document
the 1936 Nazi party Congress, was so powerful that
arrangements were made by the party to have it seen
throughout the country. In fact, after the Germans took
Austria, arrangements were made to have it seen by
that population as well. Riefenstahl’s technique was
so innovative that approaches she introduced are still
in use by directors such as Steven Spielberg today: for
example, having her subjects stationary while cameras
moved on dollies. But the film is studied today as a
powerful example of propaganda, not documentary film
making, and it would hardly be cited as a definitive
source for all that did or did not happen in Nuremburg
during the relevant time period.92
Consider the powerful impact footage can have
when it is edited in a particular way compared to how
footage of the exact same event would have appeared
if it had been edited differently, such as placing the
shot in a broader context and thus sharply diluting its
force—and therefore its usefulness to the group.
As video, by its very nature, offers only a partial,
selective view of reality, this allowed Hezbollah to focus
on specific incidents within an operation, allotting them
a significance way beyond their actual battlefield worth.
The video camera allowed Hezbollah, which attached
great value to symbolic gestures, to highlight such deeds,
transforming them into the objective of the operation.
Thus, when, in the autumn of 1994, a Hezbollah unit
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infiltrated the Israeli Dla’at military compound in Lebanon
and managed, at one point, to raise the organization’s
flag, the unit’s cameraman focused almost exclusively
on this event. Having captured this triumphant scene
on video, Hezbollah then broadcast it countless times,
turning it in effect into the whole point of the operation.
That the Israelis ultimately drove Hezbollah guerrillas
from the outpost counted for little against the symbolic
achievement of raising a flag in an Israeli military post
and was ignored.93

It is extremely doubtful that a network cameraman
on the scene would have photographed the scene the
same way or produced a comparable news piece after
editing whatever footage had been shot on the overall
operation.
Ms. Logan is quite specific in terms of what would
have to be done before any material from an insurgent
website could be considered sufficiently confirmed to
be judged usable in one of her reports, but Ms. Logan
is also widely judged one of the best journalists to have
reported from Iraq. As a result, her use of these websites
may be serving to legitimize a practice based on what
is visible on the surface, when the work that went
into her feeling comfortable about using the footage
remains behind the scenes and therefore invisible.94
I have heard concerns expressed that in at least
some instances reporters are not even confirming that
the footage they are using matches the attack they are
reporting on, and I am aware of at least one case where
I know that to be true.95 In another case, a video posted
to the web ends with a spectacular explosion when, in
fact, the Stryker vehicle that was hit was later towed
away and repaired, and the entire crew survived with
only minor injuries.96 I do not know that this footage
was ever aired by a network, but I raise the example
to make clear the dangers of relying on insurgent
editors.
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At a more basic level, an assumption that images
do not reflect a particular point of view is simply
unsupportable. Images are texts without words and
are therefore more difficult to analyze because they are
nonlinear.97 CNN’s own expert analyst for the sniper
story, for example, made clear that the sniper videos
were filmed in a particular way precisely to maximize
their emotional impact:
TUCHMAN (voice-over): The first thing the sergeant
notices is that, in his opinion, the sniper’s gunshot is
coming from a place and an angle that is different from
the cameraman’s location.
COUGHLIN: Just because of the angle where the shot
comes from and from the camera view.
TUCHMAN: Coughlin says, this shows the sniper team
is trying to maximize publicity opportunities.
COUGHLIN: It tells me that their shooter is farther away
than the cameraman is. The cameraman gets up close, so
he can actually get a good video of it, but you don’t need
to be that close to be able to shoot like that.98

Images, whether moving or still, make arguments,
and these videos, particularly when shown as a group
as CNN showed them, are a perfect example of how
arguments are expressed visually (keeping in mind
that images are always contextualized by the words
that accompany them, whether captions for still
photographs or the reporter’s voice-over for news
footage.) Taking the CNN sniper tapes as an example,
they first and foremost make the argument that the
insurgents use snipers because they are a precision
weapon, and the insurgents are profoundly concerned
that they not cause civilian casualties. This is made
clear in the translation provided by the CNN reporter/
narrator, as he translates the soundtrack.
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Michael Ware: “People are around them,” warns the
sniper’s spotter, who seems to be operating the video
camera.
“Want me to find another place?”
“No, no,” comes the reply. “Give me a moment.”99

Later, the same reporter notes:
Here, the spotter warns the shooter he only sees Iraqis,
until he’s sure he’s identified an American.”100

Notice that what is happening here is that the
insurgents have used the tapes to make an argument
about themselves, and CNN passes the argument
on uncritically, without comment or critique. Yet, in
fact, nothing could be further from the truth. These
groups all employ the tactic of using suicide bombers
to generate spectacular media events, (certainly this
particular group, the Islamic Army of Iraq, has, and
has been cited as “nearly as violent as Zarqawi’s alQaeda in Iraq.”101 They are also, remember, the group
that claimed responsibility for murdering in cold blood
the sole survivor of that Bulgarian helicopter—and
filming the act.) The surest way to make a bombing
spectacular enough to attract media attention is to
cause as many casualties as possible.102 After all, on
a typical news day, a typical suicide bombing may
or may not be singled out on the nightly news for
something more than a quick mention. And there is
never a guarantee that the visuals for any particular
suicide bombing will make it onto the nightly news on
any given evening.103 Notice that the prior practices of
the group that provided the tapes, their percentages
of sniper attacks versus bombings, are not treated
as relevant to the story in any event: for CNN these
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tapes are taken as evidence of representative practice
across the insurgency. This group provides tapes only
of sniper attacks, they are on tape talking about their
desire to avoid civilian casualties, let’s discuss, not
this individual group—which may or may not be that
dominant in the galaxy of Iraqi groups, a question
not addressed in detail—but practices across the
insurgency as if these tapes were representative of their
practice and as if their practice were representative of
the entire insurgency, without any explicit discussion
of either of those two assumptions.104
Obviously, not every act of terrorism is targeted
to the American audience, and those groups who
are concerned with other audiences will not care all
that much about what degree of violence is required
to gain the attention of the American press. But the
simple fact that these videos were sent to CNN and not
al Jazeera makes clear that this group did care about
the American audience. The only way to ensure that
a suicide bombing will be covered by the American
press—which is to say the only way to ensure that it
will be covered in detail, rather than merely mentioned—is to ratchet up the number of casualties, unless the
target is particularly symbolic or uniquely shocking.
It is the bombings that have produced spectacular
numbers of deaths that have received serious amounts
of attention. And the only way to cause large numbers
of casualties is to attack “soft”—meaning civilian—
targets. And that is exactly what has been done, over
and over again.
So why would it matter to this particular group to
be seen by an American audience as taking particular
care to avoid civilian casualties? It is far more than
simply a statement about their not being responsible
for civilian deaths. That alone might matter for an
Arab audience, but these tapes, after all, were sent to
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CNN, not al Jazeera. More than that, if they strive to
avoid civilian casualties, that suggests that they are
a military organization, or operating as one. After
all, it is militaries that target one another’s personnel
while trying to avoid civilian casualties. Creating such
a perception of themselves would simultaneously
identify this group as the equivalent of the U.S.
military, and therefore legitimate—which is to say, not
terrorist. This is the central message of the tapes, the
ultimate reason for wanting them seen by an American
audience: we are not terrorists, we are just another military
force. This is particularly important in context, since,
according to the story, the group is reaching out at this
time in part because they want to engage the United
States in negotiations. But the United States, which
might negotiate with an insurgent or militia group,
would not negotiate with terrorists.
That still leaves them as a threat to American forces.
To be sure, virtually every night the number of U.S.
casualties has been mentioned on the nightly news,
reported on cable every day, and in the papers every
morning—on print and online. During those periods
when the amount of Iraq coverage dipped, which
happened on a regular basis long before the success
of the “surge,”105 the one thing the networks always
felt obligated to mention was U.S. casualties. That is
often all that is reported—the number of troops killed,
perhaps where they died, and sometimes the weapon
that killed them. As a typical example, on April 17,
2005, Dan Harris on ABC reported that, “Insurgents in
Iraq this weekend killed three US soldiers and also an
American humanitarian worker. . . . The three soldiers
were killed and seven others wounded when mortars
hit a marine base near Ramadi. Witnesses say insurgents
also tried to infiltrate that camp.”106 (A story on the aid
worker, identified by name, followed immediately.)107
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And no doubt that mattered to all these groups; it was
helpful to them to the extent that it contributed to a
weakening of American support for continuing the
fight.108
The second argument made by the tapes sent
to CNN, of course, is that the enemy can reach any
American soldier, anywhere, anytime. It is an implicit
argument expressed visually, but that does not make
it any less powerful. Indeed, it makes it more powerful
because it remains unexpressed, and therefore difficult
to confront head on. CNN’s somewhat lukewarm
qualifiers “[t]here is no way to know everything about
the sniper threat from a single propaganda tape”109 can
never trump the power of these visuals particularly
as they are contradicted by the thrust of the overall
story.110
Finally, they argue that this is the threat our soldiers
face, since each of the videos is of snipers killing (or
apparently killing) soldiers; no other type of attack is
represented in the set.111 In fact, CNN’s reporters make
the sniper threat appear to be as great as they can:
Anderson Cooper: Michael, how often are—are these—
these snipers firing? How often are—are U.S. troops
getting killed by snipers?
WARE: well, Anderson, they’re constantly out there.
There is [sic] insurgent sniper teams operating across
the country, you could say with some confidence, every
single day of the week.
The question as to how effective they are and whether
there’s been an increase in these particular type of sniper
attacks, most pointedly here in Baghdad, is a matter of
great question at the moment. The U.S. military is not
discussing it, citing the safety of their troops, saying: We
don’t want to let the enemy know whether their tactics
are working or not.

53

So, just how many American troops are being hurt by
this is a closely guarded secret—Anderson.
COOPER: When you see it through—through their video
cameras, you see how vulnerable U.S. troops are. I mean,
you have been out there embedded. You have been
targeted by snipers. Are those tactics pretty common?
WARE: Very much so. It’s been a feature of this war,
Anderson, since the beginning. I mean, there was an
insurgent sniper in the northern city of Tal Afar at
the end of last year who was extremely patient, who
would sit for hours and hours and hours, waiting for
an American soldier in a tank to shift just that little bit
to find the narrow gap that he could shoot between the
soldier’s body armor, the plates in his body armor. At
that time, there was a Navy SEAL sniper team hunting
him. And they believe that he had received his training
in Syria. So, this is throughout the country, Anderson.
And American troops face it every single day.112

But every one of these arguments is, in fact, misleading,
if not wholly inaccurate.
At least publicly, CNN argues that the group sent
the video with the sniper images to lend credibility to
the second video they sent, the one where the group’s
leader answered questions.
We are assuming they included the sniper tape to prove
the authenticity of the Al-Shimary interview tape and to
establish their credibility. Of course, we also understood
that some might conclude there is a public relations
benefit for the insurgents if we aired the material,
especially on CNN International.113

That is implausible. The visual images would be far
more important to an insurgent group—which became
the basis for CNN’s story? The tape of a single man,
his face electronically obscured, answering questions
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in Arabic would be intended to lend credibility to the
sniper images, to validate them so they would appear
credible enough to justify the on-air attention CNN
proceeds to give them.
But the confusion over which tape would likely be
the more important to this group is of a piece with CNN’s
general confusion over the role images and, indeed,
the media itself, play within the logic of terrorism.
There is no reason, however, to believe that CNN is
any different in this from any other mainstream media
outlet. Willfully or not, CNN does not understand the
role the press plays in this war, and because they do
not—or, perhaps, simply do not care—they continue
to play that role quite effectively.
On the air the night after the story aired, Anderson
Cooper said, “even if there weren’t a single camera
around to record it, insurgents would go on shooting
Americans. They are the enemy, and that’s what they
do.”114 What Cooper fails to understand is, unlike
previous wars, that there aren’t cameras around
belonging to Western press organizations doesn’t matter.
There is no kind of forced choice for those who would
want to kill Americans—kill them in front of Western
cameras or kill them without the event being recorded
for an American audience? Because, of course, there
aren’t any press cameras around to record what is
happening for the most part. If there were, CNN
would be airing footage professionally shot by its own
people, not badly focused black-and-white footage
mailed in by the same people shooting the guns as
well as shooting the pictures. The insurgents have
simply adapted to the lack of Western cameras by
providing their own cameras, since the American press
has proven so willing to air their footage. The sniper
videos themselves deny Cooper’s statement. The enemy
will not stop killing American soldiers when Western
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cameras aren’t around, to be sure, instead they’ll simply
provide their own cameras, and provide the footage to
the American networks for the American networks,
because in the end, from their perspective, there is no
difference whatsoever. Indeed, if anything, they end
up better off, since the footage being aired has been shot
(and edited) to reflect their point of view. It is better
for their cause if the networks depend upon and use
the footage provided than using footage shot by (and
edited by) professional photojournalists. Cooper’s
statement is, in the end, a nonsensical one, at least
for a war being fought against enemies using the
methodologies of terrorism.
The footage being integrated into news pieces more
typically has also been footage of American soldiers
and marines being killed and maimed. The only reason
this is found acceptable with less controversy than met
the CNN piece, or perhaps is simply not noticed in the
same way, is because it is generally presented as footage
of a convoy being attacked, or a truck or “humvee”
or armored personnel carrier being destroyed—the
language reporters use almost always camouflages
what is being shown, as if somehow these pieces of
machinery shown being blown up were moving down
the road under their own control. The use of this
footage has become so normalized at this point that
the audience does not have to think about what they
are seeing, whereas when a network airs footage of
the death of an American soldier out in the open and
visible, there is no avoiding what is being shown, and
the response is therefore enormously negative.115 But
the networks are attempting to make a distinction in
the use of this footage between what is being watched
and what is being seen that cannot be sustained.116
The fact that American television coverage is
“sanitized” in this fashion, that bodies (at least
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American bodies) are not shown, has been noted
before by a variety of critics and scholars.117 For this
reluctance to show the human body in extremis to be
trumped, a particular image must be judged to be
extraordinarily newsworthy, and, even then, there is
tremendous sensitivity in the way a particular image is
displayed. This sensitivity is present in both broadcast
and print news outlets. So, for example, the images of
American soldiers being dragged through the streets
of Mogadishu were judged so newsworthy that they
were widely used by American newspapers, but
almost never on the front page.118 One of Ms. Logan’s
own pieces was shunted to the CBS website, but was
not aired on the nightly news, apparently because it
was not judged newsworthy enough to overcome the
degree of graphic-ness in the story.119 The image of the
bodies of four American contractors killed in Fallujah,
their bodies mutilated and hung from a bridge, was
used by all three broadcast networks and a wide variety
of newspapers—but such a broad range of decisions
was made about how to alter the image to make it
“acceptable,” through cropping or pixellating,120
(which was not the case for the Mogadishu pictures)
that very few Americans saw the image as it was
originally taken. As a result, unlike previous iconic
images, so many versions were seen that there is not a
single immediately recognizable image that will stand
the test of time. People remember the story, but it is
doubtful they will recognize the image because people
saw the image in so many different forms.121
Some have argued that this is some kind of
ideological choice made to sanitize war itself and
make it more acceptable. But, in fact, the American
news system sanitizes every type of story that involves
bodies. That included the coverage of September 11,

57

2001 (9/11), particularly compared to that seen in other
countries,122 so that, for example, almost no images were
shown of those jumping from the Towers—and when
those few were shown, the shots were intentionally
shown from an extreme distance, to make sure almost
no details were visible—and essentially none at all
of those burned or killed in the Pentagon.123 If these
choices were ideological and cut in a pro-war direction
as has been suggested, one would have expected the
coverage of 9/11 to have been less sanitized, not more,
in an effort to soften the American public’s attitudes,
to make them more likely to accept war in response to
the attack. Certainly, one would expect the footage of
the second plane hitting the second Tower to continue
to be seen—it is, after all, at that moment when it is
clear that this is an attack, an act of moral agency. Yet
that footage has essentially gone down the memory
hole, as all six networks have policies making it all but
impossible for reporters to use it for fear that it will
“upset” viewers. At this point, it is rarely even seen
during coverage of the 9/11 anniversaries. As a result,
the iconic 9/11 imagery is now difficult to distinguish
from that of any other generic disaster. Even when the
footage is used, it is inevitably cut just before the plane
actually impacts the building.124
The larger point is that this treatment of the body
in news coverage extends far beyond war. Car crashes
are a staple of local television news, but the images
that accompany such stories in every media market in
the country, on every network’s affiliates, are images
of proxies of death rather than images of death itself.
Thus one will see shoes in the road, teddy bears by the
side of the road, crumpled cars, perhaps the shape of
a covered body, but never an actual body, much less a
body part. A Boston paper was judged by its readers
to have used an image of a woman shot during a riot
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on its front page which was too graphic. It received
so much criticism from them that it had to offer an
apology to them and to the woman’s family. The Boston
Herald’s Editorial Director was quoted as saying it
“was never our intent to disrespect Victoria Snelgrove
or her family. . . . In retrospect, the images of this
unusually ugly incident were too graphic. I apologize
to the Snelgroves and the community at large.”125
By the same token, there are a range of iconic
images associated with the crashes of civilian airliners.
The pieces of the wreck itself, off in the distance, with
rescue teams in hazmat suits moving among it, perhaps
the shape of bodies in aligned body bags, above all the
front piece of the plane, crumpled and lying on its side,
are all iconic images associated with such crashes, but,
again, bodies and body parts will simply not be shown
on American television, nor will they appear in the
print press, and certainly not in shots showing great
detail, in close-up, nor shots where the body might be
identifiable by family or friends. The images from the
Lockerbie disaster when a civilian airliner was brought
down by a bomb on board match up almost identically
with the images from every other air disaster when
planes were brought down by weather, mechanical
failure, or pilot error. There is no recognizable difference. (In fact, when covering Lockerbie, photographers
were very consciously making decisions to not
photograph bodies except from a distance.126) The
news sanitizes war in the United States, in other words,
because the news sanitizes everything.127
What is ironic is that research suggests that
presenting what is happening in Iraq as less gory than
it actually is may well work in a fashion that is not
pro-war, but rather in a way that may be pro-terrorist
or at least which works to the terrorist’s advantage.128
And the way the duck blind footage is used suggests
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how. Limiting themselves to what appear to be sterile
explosions destroying vehicles and vehicles only, the
networks shy away from any footage that might be
available of suicide bombs, because unlike the IEDs,
which are used against Americans in their vehicles,
the suicide bomb, the other signature weapon of this
war, is not typically used against military convoys but
against “soft” targets—which is to say against groups of
unprotected civilians out in the open. Showing footage
of suicide bombers as they detonate would involve,
not sterile images of metal hulks exploding, the bodies
inside hidden from view, but raw images of body parts
flying, and there would be little way to disguise that
reality—by the time outlets were done cropping or
pixellating, there would be nothing left of the image.
And that would mean showing the American public
the essential nature of the enemy being fought in this
war. Thus while we see the IEDs as they explode, we
only see the aftermath of the suicide attack, after things
have been relatively cleaned up—the burning hulk of
the vehicle, crying relatives, distraught or angry crowds,
perhaps discretely covered bodies, both of the dead
and of the wounded being rushed away. Perhaps that
might seem bad enough, but often, on nights when the
networks were covering the Iraq war in only the most
abbreviated fashion—what reporters refer to as “the
police blotter,” the run down of the day’s carnage—
we did not necessarily see the crowds, the relatives,
the bodies, and the wounded. We saw only the visual
cliché of the burnt out or still burning vehicle.
Would a change in network standards, so that night
after night the American television audience had seen
suicide bombers detonating in the midst of crowds
of civilians, including large numbers of women and
children, in market places, in front of hospitals, in all
the other obviously nonmilitary locations the bombers
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have sought, and continue to seek out, have made
those audiences more insistent that American troops
be pulled out more rapidly? Or would it have given
them a compelling, perhaps irrefutable argument for
why these enemies had to be defeated at all costs?
Consider, by the same token, a story that may well
have rallied public support strongly for the American
military deployment in Iraq had more been made of it.
The initial search for two missing American servicemen
was closely followed by the press, indeed served to
temporarily spike Iraq coverage quite obviously. Yet
although the story of the search received a great deal
of coverage, the second story, a short time later, which
tragically brought closure to the first with the discovery
of the soldier’s bodies received almost no attention.
The condition of the bodies was such—because the
men had been tortured before their deaths and their
bodies mutilated afterwards—that no visuals were
possible, whereas the first story, the search, offered
multiple opportunities for visuals as troops spread out
across the area looking for their lost comrades, and as
cartoon simulations portrayed the soldier’s capture.
And the press responded as if without visuals, there
was no story. When the terrorist group responsible
later released a propaganda video of their deaths,
that too was barely even a 1-day story because, again,
visuals were impossible. As Lee Cowan said on the
CBS Morning News:
The video, issued by the Mujahideen Shura Council in
Iraq begins with an ode to Osama bin Laden, saying the
killings of the US soldiers near Yusufiyah last month
were, quote, “revenge for our sister who was dishonored
by a soldier.” What comes next is as impossible to
imagine as it is impossible to show.129

CBS appears to have not even covered the release
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of the video on their nightly news show. NBC’s
reporter said, “The Website contained videos showing
two mutilated corpses. NBC News will not show it
because of its gruesome nature.”130 They, too, only
reported the video one time during their morning
news show. There is no indication ABC covered the
story at all. So the fact that these soldiers had not only
been tortured and killed, but that their deaths had
been turned into a propaganda tool, could easily have
been missed entirely by the American public. It would
be easy, given the amount of coverage, for someone
who followed the news even fairly carefully to believe
that they were missing still, and hence to be unaware
of what the enemy had done to these two men.
Is it possible the public reaction would have been
a widespread revulsion, and a determination that the
military should be pulled out immediately, rather than
be exposed to such dangers? Yes, but it seems more
likely that a rhetorical appeal based on the theme
that “no one does this to our boys” would have been
successful.131
Other Videos, Other Images—Different Choices.
It should be emphasized that the near taboo
regarding the showing of dead bodies is a near taboo,
not an absolute one. Obviously there have been quite
dramatic images regularly transmitted from the war
in Iraq that involve the human body in extremis, in
particular many images of large numbers of dead
Iraqis. But the graphic nature of these photographs
comes from the shock of the number of bodies, not
from the state the bodies are in. Most of these images
involve victims of militias or death squads, and while
the victims have been shot at close range, their hands
bound behind them, the images are not particularly
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gory. The images of those killed in the town of Haditha,
whose deaths were themselves the point of controversy, were always displayed, for example, wrapped in
blankets (just like the victims of American car crashes),
shocking in number, ambiguous in presentation. While
we hear that large numbers of bodies have turned up
after having been beheaded, tortured, or mutilated,
and the descriptions of the state those bodies are
in is often quite graphic in the print press, those are
not images we are likely to see in the American press
anytime soon. No matter how graphic the description
in the story, those descriptions have not been—and I
predict, will not be—accompanied by pictures of any
bodies that have been obviously decapitated, where
the marks from the electric drill used as a torture
device are visible, nor will a mainstream media outlet
any day soon publish a picture of a corpse whose eyes
have been gouged out, despite the fact that reports
of such corpses have appeared in these outlets on a
regular basis. Even the photographs from abu Ghraib,
although they were published and displayed in the
American media repeatedly, were the same small set
from a much larger collection simply being shown over
and over again. The reason is that the vast majority of
those images were too graphic to pass the fairly narrow
parameters of what is considered acceptable by the
American press.
The kinds of dilemmas confronted by the press
when making decisions about which images to publish
and how to use them, particularly in the case of hostage
situations, were made especially clear in the case of
Nicholas Berg. Berg, a young entrepreneur seeking his
fortune in Iraq, was the first American whose beheading was videotaped132 and made available worldwide
via the Internet by Zarqawi’s group (many believing
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he himself wielded the knife.)
No legitimate news organization was about to air
the snuff film, but that did not mean news outlets were
not facing agonizing choices. The decision to not air
the entire video did not mean that it was not either
necessary or appropriate to air some images from the
video. Which images, then, should be aired? Networks
confronted the additional choice of whether to air
those images as moving images, as footage, or as stills
“frame grabbed” from the video, while print outlets
had to decide how prominently to display whichever
images they chose to use. Often whether images
are used on the front page or not does not reflect a
newspaper’s assessment of how important the story
the image is associated with it is, but their assessment
of how graphic the particular image is. The belief is that
those who produce the paper have no way of knowing
who will pick the paper up in the morning, and an
understanding that many read it at the breakfast table.
Putting a particularly graphic image on the front page
would therefore mean confronting their readers—and
perhaps their reader’s young children—with it without
providing fair warning. They will tend, therefore, to
put such images on the inside of the paper, “teasing”
such an image, if it reflects an important story, on the
front page. (That is what happened, for example, with
the Mogadishu images in most cases.) Today, of course,
both print and broadcast outlets face the additional
question: Should they provide on their websites
hyperlinks to websites that do provide such a video in
its entirety for their audience to permit them to view it
if they so desire?
It is when hostage videos are released by kidnappers
that it can become most transparent that the media
are serving as a direct conduit for the terrorist or
insurgent message—not, that is, for the substance
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of the information they wish to convey, but for the
actual, original message as they constructed, designed,
and staged it. There is as wide a difference as can be
imagined in seeing or hearing the words, “today the
kidnappers released a video in which the victim can
clearly be seen and heard begging for his life,” coming
from a reporter who is attempting to accurately distill,
describe, and explain what is on a tape, and actually
seeing some poor man or woman doing just that. And
there is little question that it benefits the terrorist or
insurgent group more to have the public view the
emotional spectacle than to merely read or hear about
it second hand.
To be sure, there seems little question that these
videos are newsworthy material, and that there is a
basis for the choice the news networks made, early on,
to air at least a few seconds of them. That does not mean,
however, that the choice to do so was an inevitable or
self-evident one, or that it was the choice that best served their viewers or that other considerations should not
have outweighed whatever led them to use cuts from
these videos. Certainly choices regarding how much
to use from some of these videos were hotly debated,
both before and after they were aired.
This was seen most dramatically when the tape of
Nicholas Berg’s beheading was released. The beheading
videos, of which there were a number, are themselves
part of a sub-set of hostage videos in which the hostage
is executed on camera (and as the beheadings-forcamera seemed to taper off, perhaps for fear that the
raw savagery displayed was hurting the very movement producing them,133 other forms of executions
began to take their place). The Berg video was the first,
and as discussed above, what gave the American media
such pause in that case was the systemic taboo within
American newsrooms over showing the human body
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in extremis. That attitude is balanced against the news
value of the given image, and while there was never
a chance that the actual execution would be aired,
(since it is literally impossible to imagine a news value
that would justify using that image to producers—or
convince them that their audiences would accept such
an image being aired), it left open the question of what
precisely would be shown. And yet all the networks
opted for almost precisely the same image, give or take
an additional second of footage.
NBC Nightly News and ABC’s World News Tonight
stopped the tape just as the killer drew his knife, while
The CBS Evening News went a bit further, showing the
killer grab Berg by his hair, slam him to the ground and
put the knife to his neck. “I just think you really need to
let people see as much as they can in a judicious way,”
CBS Evening News producer Jim Murphy said after the
broadcast. “By showing even that little bit, you got a
better sense of what some very bad people are willing
to do to Americans.” Both MSNBC and CNN stopped
short of showing the knife being brandished. But Fox
News—after not showing it throughout the day—did so
by Tuesday night.134

Hostage videos come in a well-defined sequence,
and although it is certainly possible for any or several
steps in the sequence to be missing, and it is also
possible for multiple videos to appear at several of
these steps. The point is that videos will not be released
out of order. First will come a video to prove that a
particular group does indeed hold a particular victim.
It is video that is used to establish the validity of the
claim that hostages are being held. Thus, for example:
Good morning, Gretchen. Well, this appears to be the
first confirmation of the hostage taking. The men were
kidnapped at dawn last Thursday from a house here in
Baghdad.
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The video, aired on the Arab news channel Al-Jazeera,
is frightening for what it shows—the three men at
gunpoint—and for what it demands. The hostage
takers say Americans Jack Hensley and Eugene “Jack”
Armstrong and Briton Kenneth Bigley will be executed
within 48 hours if women in two Iraqi prisons are not
released. The three worked for an Arab construction
company.135

Then will come a video or group of videos in which a
group’s demands are made, and its demands are linked
to threats to the hostages. Obviously, as this example
shows, steps can sometimes be compressed. And then
comes the execution tape.
Why go to the extra trouble of filming these
executions? Once the victim’s bodies are found, we
know they have been killed—as well as the method of
their execution. Why take the risk, even if it is a minimal
risk, that such a tape might provide any worthwhile
intelligence information to the other side?
The answer is that these tapes are of enormous
value to the groups who make them. They are of value
for recruiting, they are of value in rallying those who
already support the cause (particularly donors), and
they are valuable insofar as they have the potential
to demoralize the other side. It is noteworthy that for
quite some time bodies were found in Baghdad day
after day with no tapes being released of these poor
souls’ executions. In those cases, the bodies themselves
“embodied” the message of intimidation that was
being sent. It is when foreigners have been killed that
tapes have been made.136
Why are they using the Internet? Because the real battle
here is for American opinion. Al-Qaeda’s aim is to break
America’s will to stay in Iraq. And it knows that by killing
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one American and filming and putting it on the Internet,
there is more impact than a hundred hit and run attacks on
American convoys.137
Put another way,
The nightmare video of an American civilian captured
in Iraq being decapitated by his captors was anything but a
random act of terrorism, experts say—it was a press release,
carefully designed for a global audience.138

But because of the sensitivity about what is shown of a
graphic nature, there is no real difference between the
distinct categories of video in terms of what is actually
seen by American audiences: the initial video looks
little different from the videos in which demands and
threats are made, which look little different from the
execution videos. All that we see of any of them is a
Westerner, possibly in an orange jumpsuit, possibly
heard begging for his life. We know that these tapes
are different only because the reporter tells us so. But
consider the power of listening to the quotes from these
hostages, and consider the emotions that they elicit,
when no other footage is seen or shown.
On September 29, 2004, the group holding British
subject Kenneth Bigley released a video of him begging
Tony Blair for his life (in other words begging the Prime
Minister to meet the kidnapper’s demands so that he
would be released.) This was after the two Americans
taken with him already had been beheaded. ABC showed
two cuts from the video, first showing Bigley saying,
My life is cheap. He [Tony Blair] doesn’t care about me.
They then showed Bigley saying,
They don’t want to kill me. They could have killed me a
week, two, three weeks ago. Whenever. All they want is
their sisters out of prison.
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That cut was introduced by the reporter’s somewhat
odd comment that:
Bigley asked for compassion on both sides.

The video as a whole was described this way:
The video shows Ken Bigley held in a cage, chained at
the neck, hands and feet. Did they mean to evoke an
image of Abu Ghraib prison? 139

Thus Bigley is shown appealing not to the terrorists,
those actually holding his life in their hands, but to
Tony Blair, and is further shown stating that they
obviously don’t want to kill him, since they have
not done so as of yet. The reporter then suggests an
equivalence between the terrorists and Tony Blair,
since both have the ability to be compassionate, the
implication being that Tony Blair has as much control
over the situation as the men actually holding the knife
to Bigley’s throat—which is certainly the argument the
terrorists would make.
That which would lead the viewer to anger against
the terrorists most directly is precisely that which is not
shown. There is no dark conspiracy afoot here: the shots
that would arouse anger most clearly and sharply are
so graphic and grotesque that it is difficult to imagine
any network news producer or newspaper editor
choosing to use them. Indeed, the one time a shot of a
severed American head was used, (to my knowledge),
the circumstances were somewhat exceptional.140
The argument made by the networks is that showing
the beginning of the tape shows an audience more than
enough to permit their own imaginations to fill in any
necessary blanks.
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“I don’t think anybody in our audience failed to
understand what happened to Nick Berg,” said ABC
News spokesman Jeffrey Schneider, whose network
described Berg’s murder but did not show it. “I don’t
think anybody watching [World News Tonight] could
fail to understand the brutality and violence of what was
perpetrated. Therefore, we feel we did our jobs the way
we were supposed to.”141

But would it generate the kind of anger a powerful
image will?
“If you turn America’s stomach, you turn around public
support at the same time,” Felling said. “All the news
reporting, all the language, all the written word in
the world does not have the effect of one brutal video
image.”142

And when anger is subtracted, what is left? What is
going to be felt, watching someone wearing an orange
jumpsuit begging helplessly for their life? Remember,
Bigley was not begging the terrorists holding him for his
life, he was begging Tony Blair. How do we feel, hearing
these poor men blame our leaders, even suspecting
that their statements are under extreme and extraordinary duress?
To answer that, it is necessary to first go back and
explain the symbolism behind the orange jumpsuits
themselves. Obviously they are the omnipresent
symbol of the detention center at Guantanamo, but
leaving it there is too simple. When the very first
detainees arrived in Cuba, a picture circulated around
the world of them in transit to their cells, immediately
after having been taken off the plane. They were in a
narrow, outdoor corridor, chained off, in two rows,
each row of men facing out, hands bound behind their
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backs, kneeling, with some sort of goggles covering
their eyes. The picture made waves—indeed, the very
fact that their eyes were covered in such a manner
was labeled as torture in some circles143—and was
so controversial that it was raised in a press briefing
with then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
And since that was the first time the men were seen, it
was, of course, the first time they were seen in orange
jumpsuits.
By the 10th day after the first men had arrived at
Guantanamo, the press frenzy had reached such a
fever pitch that Rumsfeld held an unusual briefing
in which the only topic was the detainees and their
treatment, and he promised to stay as long as there
were questions to answer. It was then that the subject
of the now-infamous image was raised:
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since you want to clear the air
about the detainees, one of the things that have aroused
public opinion and the parliamentarians in Britain is
this photograph that shows the detainees kneeling with
their hands tied behind their back. Can you just explain
that—
RUMSFELD: I will, to the best of my ability. It’s probably
unfortunate that it was released. It’s the tension between
wanting to meet the desires of the press to know more
and the public to know more, and what that was, I’m
told, is not a detention area. That is a corridor or a
walkthrough area that came—my understanding is
something like this. When they’re on the airplane, they
wear earpieces because of the noise. You’ve ridden on
these planes. They’re combat aircraft. And we’ve all
worn earpieces. It’s no big deal.
There were a number who had tested—that were worried
about tuberculosis. So in a number of instances, they
were given masks for the protection of other detainees
and for the protection of the guards. They come out of an
airplane, and their back lowers, and they walk out.
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RUMSFELD: And then they loaded them into, I believe,
buses, and they took them down to a ferry, and they were
still restrained—their hands and their feet restrained
because of the dangers that occur during a period of
movement. They put them on a ferry, if I’m not mistaken,
and the ferry takes them across to the other side of the
Guantanamo Bay.
They get off of the ferry and into a vehicle that then
transports them to the detention center. They get out of
that vehicle and in relatively small numbers are moved
into this corridor that is a fenced area, and they are
asked to get down on the ground. They get down on the
ground, and they take off their ear pieces. They take off
their masks. They do whatever they do with them before
taking them in small numbers into the cells where they
then would be located, at which point they are no longer
in transit and, therefore, they are no longer restrained
the way they were.
What happened was, someone took a picture and released it apparently, of them in that corridor kneeling down
while their headpieces are being taken off and people
drew a whole lot of conclusions about how terrible that
was, that they’re being held in that corridor.
Now, you know, if you want to think the worst about
things, you can. If people want to ask questions and find
out what is reasonably happening, it seemed to me not
an unreasonable thing, when you’re moving them from
the vehicle they’re in towards their cells to have them
stop in some area prior to that and do what you do to get
them in a circumstance that’s more appropriate for being
in a cell than how they were arranged in the buses, the
ferries and the airplanes.
And I think you’re quite right, I think that a lot of people
saw that and said, “My goodness, they’re being forced to
kneel,” which is not true.
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QUESTION: You said it was unfortunate that that
photograph was released. I would just argue that it
was unfortunate that it wasn’t released with more
information.
RUMSFELD: Maybe. That’s fair.
QUESTION: The lesson here ought not to be...
RUMSFELD: I mean, I’m not blaming anyone for
releasing it, but...
QUESTION: ... less information or withholding
photographs, but simply releasing more information...
RUMSFELD: Fair enough.144

This picture was an ultimate visual representation
that the terrorists being captured in Afghanistan were
not just under our control but under our submission. In
that sense, it was a visual inversion, coming years later,
of Mogadishu, a message to the Islamic world that as
you do to ours, so we shall do to yours (obviously
this is in symbolic and not literal terms.)145 Then, of
course, there was the release of the images from the
abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, and in several
of those photographs as well, prisoners are wearing
orange jumpsuits (and if those images aren’t about
submission, then the word has no meaning.)
This matters because those responsible for the
kidnapping and subsequent beheading of Nick Berg
claimed that their action was a response to the abuse
of prisoners at abu Ghraib. And the claim that the
beheading was in revenge for abu Ghraib was noted
by CBS, by NBC, and repeatedly by Fox and by CNN
in their initial reporting. Since Berg, the association
between the jumpsuit as seen on detainees held in
the West and hostages held in Iraq is constantly
73

underscored and highlighted by the press. Whenever
hostages appear in these videos wearing the jumpsuit,
even when images from the videos are being shown to
viewers, reporters make a point of drawing attention to
that detail, and sometimes they go further, linking the
detail to its origins. After a South Korean businessman
was beheaded, CBS’s Elizabeth Palmer noted, “Kim
Sun-Il’s execution video, broadcast on the Arabic
TV station Al-Jazeera, looks chillingly familiar. The
captive, in an orange jumpsuit like the ones worn by
Guantanamo prisoners and Iraqi detainees.” (sic)146
When Berg himself was killed, the New York Times
reported that, “Mr. Berg appeared to be wearing an
orange jump suit similar to those issued to Iraqis in
American-run prisoners here. (sic)”147 In point of fact,
the claimed rationale was most likely false.
But most experts said they doubted Berg’s videotaped
death was a result only of those abuses. Several, noting
that Berg apparently had been kidnapped nearly a
month ago before he was killed, suggested that the
prison scandal merely provided the terrorists with an
opportunity to make a point.
“In the journalistic world, the prison photos provided
the terrorists with a ‘hook,’” said Matthew Felling, an
analyst at the Center for Media and Public Affairs in
Washington, DC.
The terrorists’ real motives, the experts said, probably
were more wide-ranging and more subtle than simple
revenge.
One motive, said Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East
history at the University of Michigan, is to frighten
Americans, especially the nongovernmental groups and
the population of some 25,000 civilian contractors—
mainly security personnel—working in Iraq who provide
a sizable armed “auxiliary” to the U.S. military and the
Coalition Provisional Authority.
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“The reason this video was made was an attempt to
destroy that auxiliary,” Cole said. “It’s not going to scare
the U.S. troops out of the country, and it’s not going to get
rid of the CPA. But there are a lot of (nongovernmental
organizations) and contractors that are going to decide
this is not the time to be doing business in Iraq.”
Another goal, the experts said, is recruitment—drawing
new members to the cause by portraying the killers as
defenders against anti-Muslim forces.
“They are trying to tap into anti-American sentiment
and use it to their own purposes . . . get more followers,
get more cash, finding more political support,” said Jim
Walsh, an international security expert at Harvard’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government.
A third, even more subtle motive might be a power
struggle within the radical Islamist movement itself,
Walsh speculated. The tape is entitled “Abu Musab alZarqawi shown slaughtering an American,” and the
Website that released the tape reportedly identified alZarqawi as Berg’s killer.
U.S. investigators say al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, has ties to
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. By taking such a high
profile, Walsh suggested, al-Zarqawi might be trying to
establish himself as the active leader of the radical Islamist
movement, leaving bin Laden in the shadows.148

Yet few outlets explored the plausibility of the
claim, and as time went on, any qualifier fell away from
press reports so that the association became hardened:
Nickolas Berg was beheaded because of the abuses
at abu Ghraib at the very least, and perhaps for the
perception of abuses at Guantanamo. In that context,
the orange jumpsuit made sense.
Nicholas Berg, in other words, died for our sins,
and the use of the jumpsuit was a visual method for
making the point unmistakable and preparing it to
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cross any language barriers. There were some people,
after all, who accepted the claim that Berg was killed
because prisoners had been abused, and even took his
death as evidence for their arguments against the way
detainees were being treated.149
With no image from the end of the tape, without
the final frame that reminded us that the blame for this
unspeakable act—which could not be justified in any
terms—rested squarely with those who had committed
it, the appearance was created that this was in some
sense if not a legitimate, then an understandable titfor-tat. We had reaped as we had sown. Again, I am not
arguing that this is what the networks were arguing. I
am arguing that they used footage that made this
argument in a subtle, powerful way—this is, after all,
ultimately, propaganda material—without showing
that part of the footage that puts the lie to that visual
claim. In essence, they aired extremely effective propaganda material without doing any of the necessary
work of unpacking or deconstructing it to make it
less effective. Indeed, rather than explain how these
tapes work to communicate the terrorist or insurgent
message, rather than explain the strategy underlying
the construction of these tapes as persuasive texts, the
reporters in some cases did the work of the terrorists by
explaining (and therefore magnifying) their message.
McGINNIS: Barry, what is the impact of this hostagetaking on stability in the region and the rebuilding
effort?
PETERSEN: I think it’s going to be very, very bad for any
effort to rebuild this country. I think it’s going to send a
signal to foreign workers, American engineers, people
who have the expertise that the rebuilding is going to
take, that this is not a place to be. It’s a very unsafe place.
And even if the people want to go, you can imagine the
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kind of family pressure they’re going to be facing from
loved ones who say, “Don’t go to Iraq.” Susan.150

Furthermore, every time a victim was shown begging for their life and wearing the orange jumpsuit, a
subtle legitimizing effect took place. Who wears these
outfits? Detainees. And who takes detainees? Those
with some authority and legitimacy. After all, we
hold detainees, we do not kidnap hostages. Repetitively
showing these hostages dressed this way, and
furthermore usually going out of their way to draw
attention to the way they were dressed, begging for
their lives, but not showing the ultimate denouement
captures a sense of shame and guilt, rather than a sense
of anger and blame.
Given this real impact, consider Hoffman’s
argument about the danger of press coverage that
over-emphasizes the personal, the individual anguish
of specific families in the midst of a hostage crisis.151
In past crises, he argues, this has had the effect
(sometimes intentional) of creating almost unbearable
pressure on the government to violate long-standing
U.S. policy and negotiate with terrorists. Because, after
all, is not the most important thing to do whatever is
necessary to bring our people home now, and end these
families’ concrete and visible suffering, and damn the
consequences (for example, the possibility that more—
and abstract—families might suffer in the future)?
When a video is released of Bigley pleading for his
life, it provides an opportunity for precisely the type
of situation Hoffman writes about: the pressure is put
squarely on the government to void its policy of not
negotiating with terrorists. How can they not move
heaven and earth to bring their man home and end this
specific family’s anguish?
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Mr. KENNETH BIGLEY (Hostage): I don’t want to
die. I don’t deserve it. Please, please release the female
prisoners that are held in Iraqi prisons. Please, please
help me see my wife, who cannot, cannot go on without
me. She really can’t. And my son...
PETERSEN: And it was his son who pleaded as
desperately to the kidnappers.
Mr. CRAIG BIGLEY (Hostage’s Son): Be merciful, as
we know you can be. Release Ken back to his wife and
family. We ask you as a family to be all merciful.
PETERSEN: The kidnappers abducted Bigley and two
Americans a week ago, and this week beheaded the
Americans. As for letting Bigley make his plea, it fell not
on deaf ears, but on the ears of a government that says it
cannot negotiate with terrorists, even to save a life.
Mr. JACK STRAW (British Foreign Secretary): I’m afraid
to say it can’t alter the position of the British government.
And as I’ve explained to the family, we can’t get into
a situation of bargaining with terrorists, because this
would put many more people’s lives at risk, not only in
Iraq, but around the world.
PETERSEN: His wife, Sombat, issued her own plea
saying, “As a loving wife, I beg you once more for
mercy.”152

Peterson introduced this clip by saying that the
kidnappers allowed Bigley to make this videotaped
plea. This framing reflects a critical misunderstanding
of the tape’s purpose and importance: while it may
have presented an opportunity for the hostage, he
was conveying the kidnappers’ message, not his own,
under duress, and the message and images in the
tape constitute a carefully constructed and extremely
powerful propaganda text: to view it otherwise is to
78

seriously underestimate its power. In short, they did
not allow it, they demanded it.
It is extremely unlikely that a network would ever
air more of a comparable tape, if another one were to
be made available. But why not air less? Is it necessary
that any of these tapes be aired for an audience to be
informed? Indeed, this seems to be the direction that
the networks were headed at the end of the spate of
brutal executions of hostages in 2004. When Hensley
was killed the next day, the video was mentioned by
NBC, but no clips were aired. The question is, was the
viewer ill-served when NBC subtracted the increment
of information that could be gained from their watching him on the terrorist’s video, as opposed to their
simply hearing NBC’s reporter say,
The report tonight on an Islamic Website claiming Jack
Hensley, a contractor from Georgia, has been executed,
the second American hostage killed in as many days.153

CBS mentioned the second video but did no story
about it and provided no quotes from it. In that case,
on September 29, 2004, Dan Rather merely says,
For the second time in a week, Al-Jazeera television
has aired a disturbing video of a Briton held hostage in
Iraq.
This latest video shows Kenneth Bigley in a cage, chained
and weeping, begging Prime Minister Tony Blair to save
his life by meeting the demands of his Iraqi captors. Blair
would say only that Britain will respond immediately if
the militants make contact. So far, they have not.154

One must again ask if the difference in what CBS’s
viewers learned on the two nights was so enormous as
to justify the fact that on the first night CBS exposed
their audience to the powerful manipulative effects
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of enemy propaganda. Did they do so purposefully?
Hardly. But they did do so without explaining that
the material they were airing was designed and
intended to manipulate, in part precisely by drawing
powerfully on the viewer’s emotions. Indeed, they
made the situation worse by highlighting precisely
those emotional appeals when they went to the family,
who could hardly be expected to have anything in
mind beyond their loved one’s safety at that moment.
In this way, CBS at least replays precisely that aspect
of the earlier coverage of the TWA 847 hostage crisis of
1985 that brought the networks so much criticism.
When a tape was released threatening a kidnapped
group of Christian Peacemakers, NBC only described
the tape:
Kidnapped two months ago, the Christian activists
included two Canadians, a Briton, and American Tom
Fox. The video ran on Al Jazeera and appeared to be a
week-old. The kidnappers threatened to kill the hostages,
saying this is the last chance for the US to meet their
demand to free thousands of Iraqi prisoners. That same
threat was made in a video released last month. But two
deadlines passed with no news.155

CBS only quoted the video after the body was found:
I offer my plea to the people of America, not to the
government of America, a plea for my release from
captivity and also a plea for a release from captivity of
all of the people of Iraq.156

There was no other coverage: no stories prior; no
mention of those earlier videos until Fox turned up
dead. Was the simple description of the tape by NBC
really a disservice to their audience?

80

If the practice of taking Western hostages, then
passing on videos of them to the press (perhaps taking
Western hostages in order to pass on such videos)
has essentially ended in Iraq, there is no reason to
believe the tactic will not be used again. It is well
worth examining the tactic and its implications to
take note of lessons learned, because there is every
reason to believe it will be coming around again soon
enough.157 Indeed, asking why the various insurgent
groups in Iraq stopped using Western hostages to gain
media attention is a reasonable place for analysis to
begin. Surely any number of factors was at play, but
researchers should be asking whether one was that
when networks stopped playing the tapes, taking
Westerners hostage stopped being a way to gain access
to the vast American audience.
It is interesting that toward the end of the use
of the hostages as part of a media strategy, some of
the most prominent victims were journalists.158 A
cynic might wonder whether the very real risk to the
hostage attendant to giving these groups the amount
and degree of air play they no doubt would have
wanted was suddenly brought home in a way it had
not been before. Certainly it is the case that the families
of reporter-hostages were left alone and accorded a
degree of respect that was never the case for the families
of any other hostage, inevitably convinced, one way
or the other, to appear on a couch on the Today Show
and answer insipid questions about how they “felt”
and “how hard” this must be for their family until the
requisite tears appeared. Of course, once a question
elicited tears, it was that question that would then be
replayed over and over again on the cable networks,
all day long.159
At a minimum, whether or not there is a relationship
between the end of the use of hostages as a media
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strategy and the end of network use of hostage videos
is both a productive question for future research
and—until a definitive answer is determined—a good
enough reason to keep any subsequent hostage material
off network air, as a hedge.160 If these groups believed
the footage would not be used by the networks, that
certainly does not necessarily mean such attacks would
stop. This is propaganda footage, and there are multiple audiences for it, including their own followers,
who view it over the Internet. It is also uploaded to the
Internet for recruitment purposes. But it surely does
not hurt for the terrorists to know that their footage
will get a wider dissemination—to one of the audiences
they care most about—than they could ever achieve on
their own.
But the press seems to be an institution without any
institutional memory. For them, a lesson learned but
forgotten after TWA 847 was: don’t let terrorists take
control of network air. A corollary, although it was not
phrased this way at the time, don’t let terrorists air their
propaganda material without comment or critique. For
the modern era, it seems that a critical lesson ought be:
Certainly don’t let them do so without transparency.
What makes this all the more amazing is that in the
1980s, after some high profile decisions by networks
covering terrorist events that were widely considered
controversial or even of extremely questionable
journalistic ethics, the networks agonized over how to
handle their coverage of terrorist events. The coverage
of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 was widely
denounced as “Terrorvision” and a “media circus,” and
many in the media conceded that their performance
had been less than their finest hour.161 The hijacked
plane was ultimately brought to Beirut. Once there, the
hostages were split up, with some kept on the plane
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and others distributed around the city to make a rescue
impossible. Those in the city were then made available
for interviews, in one particularly spectacular instance,
in a press conference staged by the hijackers. The press
negotiated with the hijackers for these interviews, and
turned the press conference into a “circus,” despite the
fact that the hostages were obviously under duress
and not able to speak freely. And the hijacker’s allies
in Beirut were frequently interviewed, executing a
press strategy said to be designed by the graduates
of the media departments of American universities.
Few doubted that the American media were being
openly and successfully manipulated.162 And since
the hijackers and their allies in Beirut were working
aggressively to favor broadcast and shut out print,
this was primarily a question of the performance of
television journalism.163
There were also questions regarding the choices
made by some journalists during the long Iran hostage
crisis. Did that coverage do what was necessary to keep
audiences as well informed as possible, or produce
the best visuals? After all, it became well known—
although, long after the fact, when it might have done
some good—that those holding the American embassy
in Tehran only actually walked the perimeter in protest
with their placards when the cameras showed up (just
as it was also only pointed out in retrospect that the
protest signs were in English, not Farsi, and for a reason.) It was not until much later that it was made known
that these “protesters” were in fact so industrious that
they actually had two sets of signs. Knowing that the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (CBC), served
a bilingual population, they would march carrying
signs reading DEATH TO CARTER only until the
cameramen signaled they had enough good footage, at
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which point they would grab the signs reading MORT
A CARTER, so that the same camera crew could get
sufficient footage for their French-speaking audience
as well.164
Conclusions and Recommendations.
The problem for the Army, and the larger military
of course, is that it has no way to enforce or even pass
on lessons that should be learned by the press. Yet it
remains the case that a war against terrorism, or, if you
prefer, against terrorists, is by definition a war of wills
and therefore a war against propaganda and images.
While I would argue that in a time of war it is not
necessary for the press to be neutral for them to perform
all their expected roles (which is why local sports
reporters are often the harshest critics of home town
teams and coaches), that is a debate for another time.
By disseminating enemy propaganda without comment or critique, the press is failing its responsibilities,
including, in any event, any responsibility to be neutral,
for the media do unwittingly facilitate the terrorist’s
purposes. A simple change in visual protocols, one
already in use in other types of stories and therefore
already available, would mean that the broadcast
media could, if they insist on continuing the practice
of using footage from the enemy of the enemy’s attacks
on American forces, at least properly contextualize that
material for their audience. That level of transparency
would seem to be the very least they owe.
The military can, and should, point this out,
aggressively and regularly. PAOs at every level
should complain when a story airs involving footage
taken from insurgent websites—but should then say, if
you’re going to use this material, the least you can do
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is present it with a disclaimer; it would be easy enough
to do.
That said, the Army has to find ways to go around
the press, to reach the American people in particular—
and other audiences as well—directly, on the assumption that continuing to depend upon the media, and only
the media, to get their message out will continue to be
insufficient. The enemy has made today’s technologies
work for them; the American military can and should
do the same. This is not a question of propaganda,
this would not be a violation of the Smith-Mundt Act
(which is interpreted to forbid “progapandizing” the
American people), this would be a simple continuation
of the current public affairs obligations of every unit.
The question is whether the military is currently
able to fulfill those obligations effectively. If enemy
propagandists are able to spread false information,
and that information is being spread globally—in part
through the American media—then the military’s
public affairs obligations are not being fulfilled. Enemy
propaganda and misinformation, whether textual or
visual, have to be answered, whether they are being
distributed to a foreign or domestic audience. No law
can reasonably be interpreted as meaning the Army
cannot correct lies being told to the American people
by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.
If the truth is known, then military spokespeople
need to be proactive, to engage in rapid response
or, if at all possible, to get out ahead of stories that
are predictable. To be sure, the military has gotten
progressively better at this. When two soldiers were
kidnapped in 2007, a massive search was underway
for them in Iraq. Although the soldiers were not found
during that initial search, insurgent video of their
military ID cards was.165
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Rather than get out ahead of that story, the Army
waited for the insurgent propaganda video to appear,
and then attempted to respond. In fact, possession
of the video meant that while the inevitability of the
propaganda video’s release was clear, the military had
a huge advantage in terms of constructing a preemptive
response. The choice to cede that advantage put the
military, unnecessarily, in a reactive posture, when the
military is already going to be in a reactive posture,
unavoidably, all too often.
Yet a few years later, military PAOs were being
far more aggressive in getting out ahead of what the
insurgents were about to do in terms of propaganda,
so that when, for example, a suicide bomber in Afghanistan killed several children along with a number
of other civilians in December 2008, they were not
allowed to shape and frame the narrative to their liking
but were themselves forced into the reactive posture,
when surveillance video of the bomber detonating in
plain view of the children was released, thus proving
that the murder of the children had not only occurred
but was an intentional act—the bomber clearly saw the
children and made the choice not to wait until they had
left the area to detonate.
In this, the American military can take a lesson from
the Israeli military. In 2006 the Israelis misunderstood
the nature of the war they were fighting in Lebanon. As
a result, they were quite literally fought to a standstill,
not on the field of battle (and certainly not in the
air) but on the airwaves, in the court of international
public opinion. Ironically, international opinion began
strongly on their side, with even Arab nations prepared to support their efforts against Hezbollah.166 But
Hezbollah was able to manipulate the press coverage
carefully—and through the coverage, opinion—to
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the point that the demands for Israel to halt military
operations were ultimately insurmountable. Israel
responded with detailed refutations of Hezbollah’s
charges—5 months later. Carefully documenting the
way that airstrike after airstrike had been a response
to Hezbollah rockets carefully hidden or placed
among the civilian population may well have made an
enormous difference in answering charges that Israel
did not care about civilian casualties, was intentionally
causing them, and was violating international law, if
material had been released in real time. Five months
after the fact was an after thought at best.
Although this was in a report actually provided
by a private group (run by a retired officer in military
intelligence), the very first footnote states that the
“study was supported by Military Intelligence, the
Operations Division of the IDF [Israeli Defense
Forces] General Staff, the IDF Spokesperson, and the
legal experts of the IDF and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.”167 Its release was covered in the American
press, but hardly as an item of vital importance in the
moment.168
Yet 2 years later, when Israel launched military
operations against Gaza, visual product was made
available to the press on a regular basis, so that Israel’s
claims about the nature of the targets they were hitting
had some degree of visual support in a large amount of
the American television coverage, at least. More than
that, the same clips were released to the general public
via Israel’s own YouTube channel.169 Indeed, an Israeli
diplomat conducted what the New York Times believes
to be the first-ever press conference on Twitter.170
MNF-I has its own YouTube channel as well. But
while soldiers, sailors, and marines are all producing
interesting, riveting, even moving material, all
posted daily to the various video sharing sites such
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as YouTube,171 very rarely is new material pegged for
subscribers to the official MNF-I channel, and what
material does go up and what material is pegged is almost invariably dry and boring.172 When it is suggested
that all units should take advantage of soldiers’
familiarity with digital media and desire to record by
designating someone to film every operation—if only
to ensure there is a visual record to counter any lies
told after the fact—this author has encountered serious
resistance from military personnel, to include Public
Affairs (PA) personnel. (Of course, there are some
lessons the Israelis didn’t learn. In 2006, they refused
to permit Western journalists to accompany their
ground forces, which meant reporters wishing to cover
the situation on the ground in Lebanon—which was
basically all of them—had no choice but to go in through
the Hezbollah controlled side, under Hezbollah’s rules,
to see what Hezbollah wanted them to see, no more
and no less, and to broadcast that, no more and no
less. In 2008, they similarly refused to permit Western
journalists access to Gaza, which meant there was no
independent confirmation of any casualty reports, and
Western news outlets could either report the numbers
coming from Palestinian sources or report no numbers
at all. Most split the difference by reporting very vague
numbers for as long as they could, but surely the
Israeli side would only have been helped by having
independent witnesses on the ground.)
The problem is that all too often the American
military has responded to claims made against it by
saying merely that an incident is under investigation.
That is not a response. That is an answer that
simultaneously freezes the potential for response—
because what it says is that no real response will be
forthcoming for an indefinite period of time—and one

88

that opens the possibility that the claims made by the
other side might be true, because if they weren’t, what
would be the need for an investigation? If in fact the
truth is not known, then by all means an investigation
is in order, because nothing will erode credibility more
rapidly than to have to reverse positions already taken.
But it is critical that investigations be completed as
quickly as possible, while issues remain in the public
eye, and that they not be used as a rhetorical crutch if
there is no real need for them.
Consider what happens when military units think
strategically about the role the media play in operations. In November 2004, the first thing the marines
did before beginning the full brunt of the assault on
Fallujah was to take control of the hospital,173 ensuring
that it could not be used as a center for negative, false
propaganda—at least without that propaganda being
immediately countered, or without Western media
being able to confirm or deny claims for themselves.174
Despite the fact that much of the press coverage
centered on a series of themes designed to downplay
the marines’ accomplishment in clearing out the city
of Fallujah,175 the overall effort was still perceived as a
success—or at least was not seen as a failure. Several
polls showed the slightest rise in positive attitudes
toward the war at around that time.176 Put simply, the
“absence of Western media in Fallujah allowed the
insurgents greater control of information . . . Because
Western reporters were at risk of capture and beheading, they stayed out and were forced to pool video shot
by Arab cameramen and played on Al Jazeera.”177 By
contrast, “[f]alse allegations of noncombatant casualties were made by Arab media in both campaigns, but
in the second case embedded Western reporters offered a rebuttal.”178
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Military spokespeople should be permitted to
speak to the public and the press when they are only
able to speak in terms of probabilities. So long as they
make clear that they are only able to speak in those
limited terms—we cannot be positive yet, we are in
the midst of an accountability check to confirm, but
we do not believe the claim that marines have been
captured—there will be times when doing so will be
far less damaging than saying nothing until they are
able to speak with absolute certainty.
There is, of course, more to being proactive.
Opportunities come along to either get ahead of a
particular story or, on occasion, make news, and the
military has been too hesitant on both accounts. For
example, when enemy media labs have been captured,
some of the material found there has been what might
best be referred to as Islamist blooper reels. So that :
they put a video out, but when we find these places we
find a lot of their edits, and . . . they have stuff they saved
where they botched it up, for example a guy riding a
horse with a gun and he’s trying to look tough and he
hits a tree and it knocks him off.179

Let’s face it, that’s nothing short of comedy gold—
you literally couldn’t make that up. Having footage of
that nature fall into your hands presents an unbelievable opportunity. Why wasn’t that clip ever circulated
to make that group look ridiculous, to puncture their
carefully crafted image of strength, of toughness, and
manliness—and most of all, of competence? Indeed,
that wasn’t the only such video.
[There was ] another one where a guy’s on the back of a
motorcycle, he’s going to jump off and start shooting, he
looks real tough, but when he jumps off he just falls head
over heels, the guy goes flying.180
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Obviously, that clip was never released either.
What was the reason for the hesitance? There was,
of course, a famous video released of Zarqawi that
made him look exceedingly foolish—the highlight was
probably the moment where he was supposed to be
firing his weapon for dramatic effect, but it jams, and,
unsure what to do next, he signals over an underling,
who, also unsure what to do, grabs the gun by the
(now very hot) barrel and very obviously burns himself.
Apparently there were negative reactions to that video
that led to the decision to hold-off on further releases:
A lot of folks in the theater particularly reacted like we
were making fun of him in a way [well, that would have
been a correct interpretation of course, we were -cd], and
we did do some polling and . . . , it didn’t come off so
well, [which is] why we’re a little tentative.181

The polling data were unavailable, so it is
impossible to comment on it specifically, but when
a communications strategy does not work as well
as hoped, it is often a better idea to look for ways to
improve upon the execution of the strategy than to
toss it entirely. Was the response to the Zarqawi video
really so negative that it suggests there is absolutely
no point revisiting the use of such material, in any
configuration, with any framing or presentation, at
any point? Or were there nuances to those responses
that could be used in crafting such releases? I cannot
say without access to the data, but surely there is
some way to make use of material such as this when
it falls into the military’s possession. Closer study of
the Zarqawi data is clearly warranted—if this material
has been found in some labs, it will be found in others,
and having a skeletal strategy in place that takes that
experience into account would be well worthwhile.
91

At a minimum, trying to determine if the negative
response was to some extent context-based would be
very important.
The war against Islamist insurgents will continue
to be, in large part, a war against arguments,
symbols, and images. That such a war is being fought
in an information context unlike any other only
complicates the challenges faced by the U.S. Army,
and the U.S. military generally. New information and
communication technologies are being used to great
synergistic effect by the enemy: the military has to
understand how this works and be prepared to make
use of such technologies to counter enemy messaging
to the extent possible, as quickly as possible. This
cannot, by definition, be left to the PAO community,
but must be understood by, and participated in, the
entire military to have a chance at success.
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